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I. INTRODUCTION 
In January 2009, President Obama assumed office, Democrats 
assumed control of Congress, and many assumed that 
comprehensive health reform could be signed into law by the end 
of the year.1  Political opponents and competing stakeholders alike 
aspired “to move from a nonsystem to a system of health care,”2 
and finally overcome “the health system’s chaotic 
disorganization.”3 Whether federal reform should occur had 
become a given; debate now centered on how to pursue “the Four 
Cs” of “coverage, cost control, coordinated care, and choice.”4
Whether measured or bold, effective reform must target the 
causes of the U.S. “nonsystem” and so far, Congress has paid 
scant attention to a fundamental one: ERISA preemption of state 
law.  Since its enactment in 1974, the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act’s preemption language has been endlessly and 
inconsistently interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court—sometimes 
to protect patients,
  
Not surprisingly, though, the always difficult task of health 
reform proved even more challenging when competing with 
economic recession, rising unemployment, foreign wars, and 
spiraling deficits for scarce political and financial capital.  Thus, by 
the 111th Congress’ August 2009 recess, early enthusiasm for 
reform had devolved to distaste for hard—and expensive—
choices, making it increasingly likely that federal action, if any, 
would leave much unresolved. 
5 but more often to shield health payers, 
particularly managed care organizations, from accountability for 
their decisions regarding who will be treated and who will be paid 
for providing that treatment.6
 
 1. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Taps Clinton Ideas but Not Clinton Herself, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 
2009, at A19 (“Experts say the political climate for passing major health care changes is more 
favorable than ever, with business leaders, pharmaceutical and hospital executives, insurance 
officials and advocates for patients all agreeing the need is urgent.”). 
  In a nation where most people 
 2. Denis Cortese & Jeffrey O. Korsmo, Health Care Reform: Why We Cannot Afford to Fail, 28 
HEALTH AFFAIRS w173, w174, available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/search?andorexactfulltext=and&resourcetype=1&disp_type=
&author1=cortese&fulltext=health+care+reform&pubdate_year=&volume=&firstpage= (follow 
hyperlink to PDF) (last visited Oct. 26, 2009). 
 3. Henry J. Aaron, The Pitfalls of Overreaching in Health Reform, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS W184, W185, 
available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/search?andorexactfulltext=and&resourcetype=1&disp_type=
&author1=aaron&fulltext=overreaching+in+health+reform&pubdate_year=&volume=&firstpage= 
(follow hyperlink to PDF) (last visited Oct. 17, 2009). 
 4. Victor R. Fuchs, Health Reform: Getting the Essentials Right, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS W180, available 
at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/search?andorexactfulltext=and&resourcetype=1&disp_type=
&author1=fuchs&fulltext=Health+Reform%3A+Getting+the+Essentials+Right&pubdate_year=&vo
lume=&firstpage= (follow hyperlink to PDF) (last visited Oct. 17, 2009). 
 5. See infra note 188 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra notes 165 and 210 and accompanying text. 
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already receive health coverage through employer-sponsored 
benefits plans and many more will do so should Congress enact 
an employer mandate, ERISA preemption is a major reason for a 
nonsystem that too frequently harms patients, frustrates 
providers, and undermines state efforts to impose order on the 
resulting “chaotic disorganization.”7  Yet, ERISA preemption 
reform has been virtually absent from the health reform debate, 
although it is not clear why.8  Perhaps this reflects a pragmatic 
determination by lawmakers to effect change without making 
“perfect the enemy of the absolutely necessary.”9  Perhaps 
Congress erroneously views ERISA preemption as no longer being 
a problem once it passes individual and/or employer coverage 
mandates.  Or perhaps ERISA’s wider impact on health care is 
being overlooked or underplayed simply because it is too complex 
and confounding to appreciate, let alone fix.  Whatever the 
reasons, the results are clear: the laudable goal of expanding 
coverage will only compound existing problems for patients and 
providers in dealing with health care payers.  Thus, federal 
legislators must address ERISA preemption to ensure managed 
care accountability to patients and providers.  Clarification of 
ERISA’s preemptive reach is also needed to spell out the role of 
states in health care oversight since, with no single payer option 
on the table, current reform efforts will inevitably require both 
federal and state regulation of health care.10
The process by which ERISA preemption has deprived patients 
of their health benefits, denied providers reimbursement, and 
derailed too many promising state efforts to improve  the “Four 
Cs” of “coverage, cost control, coordinated care, and choice” has 
been a long and tortured one.  This article begins with the 
mechanics of ERISA preemption and then examines the evolution 
  This article will 
clarify why and how to do just that. 
 
 7. See Aaron, supra note 3. 
 8. To the extent ERISA reform has been discussed in the context of national health reform, it 
has tended to focus on whether self-insured plans will continue to enjoy a lack of governmental 
oversight.  See, e.g., Opinion, Repealing ERISA, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2009, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203946904574298661486528186.html?mod=google
news_wsj (last visited Oct. 26, 2009). 
 9. Remarks of President Barack Obama, Weekly Address, The White House (Feb. 7, 2009)  
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog_post/compromise1/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2009) 
(lauding the Senate for reaching a compromise on his economic recovery plan because “we can't 
afford to make perfect the enemy of the absolutely necessary.”).  President Obama’s comment is one 
of many variations of a quote attributed to the philosopher Voltaire who stated in his DICTIONAIRE 
PHILOSOPHIQUE (1764) “[l]e mieux est l’ennemi du bien,bien” (translating literally as “the best is the 
enemy of the good,” but often rephrased as “the perfect is the enemy of the good.”). 
 10. See Alan Weil, A New Approach to the State-Federal Relationship in Health, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS, 
w188, w192, available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/search?andorexactfulltext=and&resourcetype=1&disp_type=
&author1=weil&fulltext=A+New+Approach+to+the+State-
Federal+Relationship+in+Health&pubdate_year=&volume=&firstpage= (follow hyperlink to PDF) 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2009). 
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of ERISA’s preemptive effect on managed care in particular and 
health policy in general.  It does so by categorizing an unwieldy 
body of case law into seven stages that trace the courts’ 
progression from no preemption of state law claims against 
managed care payers, to broad preemption, retreating to limited 
preemption and, for now at least, trending again toward broad 
preemption. 
During the first stage of litigation, health maintenance 
organizations [HMOs] were novel entities and lower courts 
readily adapted theories of direct and vicarious hospital liability 
to hold them liable for patient treatment decisions; ERISA 
preemption was not even raised as a defense.11 After ERISA had 
existed for at least a decade without intersecting with HMO 
liability claims, a second stage unfolded.  Relying on non-health 
benefits rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court, creative defense 
attorneys argued successfully that ERISA broadly preempted the 
kinds of HMO liability claims that could be asserted against 
hospitals.12 Judicial struggle characterizes the third and fourth 
stages as courts sought to follow the Supreme Court’s twists and 
turns concerning the scope of ERISA’s complete and conflict 
preemption of state law regarding what had become known as 
managed care organizations (MCOs).13
A brief fifth stage saw creative lawyering at work once again, 
but this time on behalf of patients.  Faced with mounting failures 
in overcoming ERISA preemption of state law remedies, the 
plaintiff’s bar invoked ERISA’s own civil enforcement provisions, 
but the strategy failed when the U.S. Supreme Court changed 
course yet again.
 
14  This portended tighter limits on ERISA 
preemption with an attendant expansion of state law remedies, 
particularly for patient tort claims arising out of medical necessity 
determinations.15  Sadly for patients, providers, and state 
legislators, though, a sixth stage shows the Supreme Court 
returning to the expansive ERISA preemption of earlier days.16
 
 11. See infra notes 44–53 and accompanying text. 
  
Along the way, unsustainable increases in health care costs and 
the uninsured along with congressional intransigence have incited 
states to take the lead in expanding coverage, improving access 
and controlling costs.  Whether ERISA will preempt such 
measures is the focus of an emerging seventh stage of judicial 
inconsistency that will generate even more confusion unless 
Congress implements comprehensive reform and/or loosens the 
 12. See infra notes 54–74 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra notes 75–153 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra notes 145–210 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra note 165 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra note 211–55 and accompanying text. 
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ERISA ties now binding the states.17
Collectively these stages reveal that whether Congress enacts 
comprehensive reform or moves more incrementally, it must 
confront ERISA preemption directly and explicitly recalibrate the 
roles of federal and state governments in overseeing health care.  
Truly comprehensive reform, albeit an earlier goal that seems 
increasingly unlikely, might exert so much federal control as to 
displace state law entirely.  A more likely result would leave state 
law intact, at least with regard to individual patient-MCO and/or 
provider-MCO disputes, and perhaps in other respects, too.  
Consequently, the most likely result of federal reform or no 
reform at all is the same: states will continue to partner with the 
federal government in regulating health care.  And with or 
without federal reform, states need greater freedom or at least 
greater clarity as to how to operate effectively given the specter of 
ERISA preemption.  Congress can address this by amending 
ERISA’s preemption provisions and/or liberalizing the 
availability of ERISA waivers, but it must not pursue the “Four 
Cs” at the expense of patients, providers, and the states.  When it 
comes to ERISA, its current strategy of saying little and doing less 
is akin to expecting the ERISA preemption elephant to leave the 
room on its own accord.  But, as explained below, thirty five years 
of litigation demonstrate unequivocally that this elephant will 
continue to trample patients and providers, and hamper state 
innovation and oversight unless and until Congress shows it the 
door. 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
a. Background and Mechanics of ERISA Preemption 
Prior to ERISA’s enactment in 1974, states regulated the 
formation and administration of employee pension plans in an 
often complex and frequently inconsistent manner.18  Even well-
meaning plan administrators could easily mismanage a plan in the 
face of conflicting state directives, and dishonest plan 
administrators had ample opportunities to under-fund or 
misdirect plan assets. In response, Congress passed the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 197419
 
 17. See infra notes 287–347 and accompanying text. 
 to protect employee 
benefit plan participants and their beneficiaries by federalizing, 
 18. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REC. 29, 197 (1974) (statements of Sen. Williams that ERISA’s 
“substantive and enforcement provisions of the conference substitute are intended to preempt the 
field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and local 
regulation of employee benefit plans.”); id. (statement of Sen. Dent that preemption “eliminate[s] 
the threat of conflicting and inconsistent State and local regulation."). 
 19. Id.; 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006). 
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and supposedly simplifying, regulation of plan administration.  
As the United States Supreme Court stated in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. 
McClendon, Congress intended, “to ensure that plans and plan 
sponsors would be subject to a uniform body of benefits law; the 
goal was to minimize the administrative and financial burden of 
complying with conflicting directives among States or between 
States and the Federal Government.”20
ERISA’s content reflects Congress’ focus on preventing fraud 
and mismanagement in plan administration.
 
21  As the U.S. 
Supreme Court has observed, ERISA “does not go about 
protecting plan participants and their beneficiaries by requiring 
employers to provide any given set of minimum benefits . . . .”22  
Rather, ERISA controls the administration of benefit plans 
through its detailed provisions concerning plan design and 
administration (e.g., reporting and disclosure requirements,23 
participation and vesting provisions,24 funding standards25 and 
the fiduciary obligations of plan administrators26
To protect plan administrators from the untoward results of 
unduly complicated and potentially contradictory state 
regulations, ERISA also contains a three-part preemption 
provision.  Section 514(a) states that ERISA shall “supersede any 
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter ‘relate to’ 
an employee benefit plan . . . .”
).  Given its 
purpose of controlling plan administration and its particular focus 
on pension plans, such detailed directives contrast starkly with its 
silence about the complexities of a plan participant’s ability to 
obtain quality health benefits. 
27  “Saved” from the so-called 
“relate to” clause (or excluded from preemption) are those state 
laws that qualify, inter alia, as state insurance law.28  However, 
states are precluded from “deeming” a law to constitute insurance 
regulation for the purpose of “saving” a law which would 
otherwise “relate to” a plan and trigger “relate to” preemption.29
 
 20. 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990). 
  
To further complicate matters, ERISA does not expressly define 
 21. ERISA applies to employee welfare and pension benefit plans that provide “medical, 
surgical, or hospital care or benefits” for plan participants and their beneficiaries “through the 
purchase of insurance or otherwise.”  29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). 
 22. New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 
651 (1995) (hereinafter Travelers). 
 23. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (2006). 
 24. Id. at §§ 201-211. 
 25. Id. at §§ 301-308. 
 26. Id. at §§ 1131-1145. 
 27. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006).  State 
laws subject to possible preemption include “all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State 
action having the effect of law, of any State.”  Id. at § 1144(c)(1). 
 28. Id. at § 514(b)(2)(A), § 1444(b)(2)(A). 
 29. Id. at § 514(b)(2)(B), § 1444(b)(2)(B). 
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“relate to” and also fails to explain what constitutes state 
insurance law for the purposes of the savings and deemer clauses. 
Initially, state efforts to invoke saving clause protection to 
regulate an emerging managed care industry provided small 
relief.  In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts,30 the 
Supreme Court looked to its prior interpretation of similar 
language in the McCarron-Ferguson Act31 and held that, to be 
saved, a state law would need to regulate “the business of 
insurance”32 which itself needed to (1) transfer or spread the 
policyholder’s risk, (2) be integral to the insurer-insured 
relationship, and (3) be limited to insurance entities.33
Consistent with expansive preemption, many courts initially 
interpreted Metropolitan Life as requiring that all three McCarron-
Ferguson factors had to be satisfied in order to qualify as the kind 
of state insurance regulation that could be saved from 
preemption.
  This meant 
that states could not regulate managed care entities that share 
financial risk instead of transferring or spreading risk as 
conventional insurers do.  Also out of reach were managed care 
entities acting as third-party administrators (TPAs) for self-
insured plans since self-insurers do not transfer actuarial risk to an 
independent entity. 
34  Typically, a self-insured plan retains financial risk 
even though administrative functions may be delegated to a third 
party that may simultaneously serve as an indemnity insurer for 
other contracts.  Thus, insured and self-insured plans may look 
virtually identical to plan beneficiaries since the same “players” 
may be involved.  While subtle, the enormously significant 
technicalities of risk transfer mean that only conventionally 
insured plans are subject to state insurance regulation while self-
insured plans are not.35
 
 30. 471 U.S. 724 (1985). 
  When ERISA was enacted in 1974, self-
insurance was seen as appealing only to large employers.  
Following 1985’s Metropolitan Life decision, however, plans of all 
sizes astutely recognized that self-insurance could evade state 
oversight.  Seeing a growing market, indemnity insurers 
developed purely administrative products, making self-insurance 
feasible even for smaller plans.  Not surprisingly, the number of 
 31. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (2006). 
 32. Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 743. 
 33. Id. (relying on its prior interpretation of “the business of insurance” in Union Labor Life Ins. 
Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982), regarding state insurance law’s exemption from federal anti-
trust oversight under the McCarron-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a)). 
 34. See infra note 203 and accompanying text. 
 35. To illustrate, statements regarding an individual’s health care expenditures may be issued 
by Aetna Insurance without the patient ever appreciating whether Aetna is bearing the full financial 
risk (and, thus acting as an insurer), or simply acting as a third-party administrator of a separate 
self-insured plan. 
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self-insured plans quickly grew. 
Section 514 preemption of state law and, therefore, state 
remedies, leave ERISA’s section 502(a) civil enforcement scheme 
as the sole avenue of relief for negligent medical necessity and 
other benefits determinations.  Appropriate relief would normally 
be found by filing a state tort claim for monetary damages, but 
under section 514, this is no longer possible since state tort or 
legislative relief would not be saved as limited to the business of 
insurance.36  Yet, section 502 only permits equitable relief for 
obtaining benefits that have been denied or delayed.  Ex ante, this 
can require a patient to pursue the plan’s administrative appeals 
process and/or retain an attorney and seek preliminary injunctive 
relief while in the midst of a health crisis – a daunting process 
even for healthy claimants.  Ex post equitable relief for a 
beneficiary who has suffered serious harm or death due to a 
denial or delay in receiving such benefits is obviously futile.  
Consequently, ERISA’s section 514 preempts state remedies while 
section 502(a)(3)’s limited, “other equitable relief” precludes 
monetary damages even where equitable relief is so clearly 
hollow.37
A state tort remedy may still be available against a defendant 
(such as a treating physician) who is not shielded from suit 
through ERISA preemption.  However, the age of managed care 
created a new liability scenario in which the patient and physician 
are often aligned against a managed care organization that seeks 
to block, limit, or change the care deemed medically necessary by 
the physician.  No longer does a medical malpractice case 
necessarily pit an injured patient against an allegedly negligent 
physician because, in many cases, the patient has no cause of 
action against the doctor where the care itself was not negligently 
administered.  Rather, the harm was rooted not in the quality of 
treatment rendered but in an HMO-determined treatment 
protocol that was not what the doctor had ordered.  Thus, in a 
medical injury case based on a managed care (as opposed to a 
physician’s) decision, ERISA preemption of state law effectively 
leaves the injured party with no remedy. 
 
This result contradicts Congress’ original intent of making 
ERISA an employee-protective statute.  Despite the lack of any 
indication that Congress intended to leave patients with no 
meaningful remedies, recipients of health benefits through ERISA-
qualified plans are cast into the so-called “ERISA vacuum” of no 
meaningful remedies and no sensible federal or state regulations 
 
 36. See infra notes 184-210 and accompanying text. 
 37. See, e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs, 508 U.S. 248, 263 (1993) (monetary damages 
unavailable); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144 (1985) (unavailability of extra-
contractual, compensatory, or punitive damages under section 502). 
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to preclude such plan behavior.38
ERISA preemption affects managed care in a variety of ways 
that can be roughly—very roughly—divided into (1) quality and 
(2) provider contracting issues. State quality initiatives that have 
been preempted include mandated benefits, grievance 
requirements, and personal injury actions for HMO decisions 
directing or restricting medical care.
  In contrast, HMO liability 
toward non-ERISA plan enrollees under state law is not 
compromised by ERISA preemption.  The HMO’s accountability 
under state tort law, therefore, varies with the ERISA status of the 
particular plan involved—a result that further contravenes 
congressional intent. 
39  ERISA has also preempted 
state efforts to address provider-contracting issues such as any 
willing provider laws, de-selection criteria, and financial incentive 
and risk-sharing arrangements (which might also be placed in the 
quality category due to their influence on provider behavior and, 
therefore, patient care), as well as state initiatives to expand 
coverage.40
As a result, quirks in ERISA’s structure and text, combined 
with inconsistent judicial interpretations have fueled the 
frustrations of patients, providers, and state legislators in dealing 
with managed care.  Patients complain about perceived 
inadequacies in plan coverage and accountability, inciting adverse 
media coverage and litigation.
 
41  Providers are constrained in the 
practice of medicine and often have to fight for reimbursement.42
 
 38. The earliest judicial mention of this term appears to have occurred in the non-health 
benefits case of Gast v. Stevenson, 585 P.2d 12, 22 (Or. Ct. App. 1978). For a more recent example, 
see Pichoff v. QHG of Springdale, Inc., 556 F.3d 728, 732 (8th Cir. 2009). 
  
 39. For an overview of early ERISA preemption litigation, see Mary Ann Chirba-Martin & 
Troyen A. Brennan, The Critical Role of ERISA in State Health Reform, 13 HEALTH AFFAIRS 142 (1994). 
 40. Id. at 150–52. 
 41. Managed care denials of medical care have fueled several films, including 2002’s “John Q.” 
a fictional account of a father’s desperate efforts to secure coverage for his son’s heart transplant, 
and Michael Moore’s 2007 documentary “Sicko” recounting myriad “HMO horror stories.”  JOHN 
Q. (New Line Cinema 2002); SICKO (Dog Eat Dog Films, Inc. 2007). 
ABC News’ Good Morning America and similar programs frequently cover such stories as well.  
See, e.g., Chris Cuomo & Gerry Wagschal, Amputee Fights for Coverage of Prosthetics: GMA Helps 
Woman Gets Special Prosthetic Legs After Insurance Company Denied Her, ABC NEWS, Jan. 14, 2009, 
available at http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/GetsAnswers/story?id=6640663&page=1. 
See also Lisa Girion, Insurer's Agreement to Cover Surgery Comes Too Late, LA TIMES, Oct. 8, 2009, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/08/business/fi-cigna8; Health Insurer to Be Charged With 
Teen's Murder: California Family Will Sue Medical Insurer for Delaying a Potentially Lifesaving Surgery, 
ABC NEWS, Dec. 21, 2007, available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/CancerPreventionAndTreatment/story?id=4038257&page=1 
(reporting on attorney Mark Geragos’s promise “to press murder or manslaughter charges” against 
Cigna HealthCare because it “’maliciously’” delayed approving a liver transplant for 17-year old 
Nataline Sarkisyan).  The family’s contract and unfair business practices claims were dismissed as 
preempted by sections 502 and 514, although their claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress survived.  Sarkisyan v. CIGNA Healthcare of Cal., Inc., 613 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (C.D. Ca. 
2009). 
 42. See infra notes 234-55 and accompanying text. 
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In the meantime, many states have enacted as well as rejected 
various approaches to “regulating around” ERISA, but have had 
little, if any success.43
b. The Stages of HMO Liability and the Phoenix of ERISA 
Preemption 
  Consequently, ERISA, an employee-
protective statute, has become the mainstay for relieving plans of 
accountability for medical decisions, and has shifted the risk of 
harm to the patient/plan participant. Still, in juggling ERISA 
preemption, one point that is crucial to hold onto yet is so easily 
overlooked is that whether a plan is conventionally or self-
insured has no significance for preemption purposes unless the 
asserted law or claim first satisfies the “relate to” clause.  And it 
is precisely at this “starting gate” of ERISA preemption analysis 
that, in theory, the greatest gains can be made by the tort litigant 
or state rule maker.  In practice, however, such possibilities have 
remained largely unrealized due to the inherent complexity of 
ERISA’s text, the inconsistency of the U.S. Supreme Court and 
other courts charged with its interpretation, and the political 
contentiousness of a federal legislative cure. 
Stage 1: Parallel Play – HMO Liability and ERISA Preemption 
Peacefully Co-Exist 
Despite efforts to integrate the finance and delivery of care 
since the 1930s—the hallmark feature that distinguishes managed 
care from fee-for-service indemnity insurance—managed care did 
not capture a significant share of the employee health insurance 
market until Congress passed the HMO Act of 1973.44  That law 
sought to promote HMOs by offering financial incentives, lifting 
state impediments to HMO formation and enrollment, and 
requiring large and mid-size employers providing employee 
health benefits to offer an HMO option.45  Notwithstanding these 
efforts, managed care did not achieve its present market 
dominance until the 1990s.46
 
 43. See infra notes 256-93 and 315-16 and accompanying text. 
 
 44. Federal HMO Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1973). For an overview of the history of 
managed care before and after passage of the HMO Act, see Eleanor D. Kinney, Procedural 
Protections for Patients in Capitated Health Plans, 22 AM. J. L. & MED. 301, passim (1996). 
 45. 42 U.S.C. § 300(e) (1973). 
 46. In 1970, just 37 HMOs existed in fourteen (mostly western) states with enrollment totaling 
three million.  Due to increased federal funding, looser federal requirements and structural 
diversification, HMOs neared 500 in number and twenty-five million in enrollment by 1987.  Lynn 
R. Gruber, Maureen Shadle, & Cynthia L. Polich, From Movement to Industry: The Growth of HMOs, 7 
HEALTH AFFAIRS 197, 197-99, 201 (1988).  See also, Gail A. Jensen, et al., The New Dominance of 
Managed Care: Insurance Trends In The 1990s, 16 HEALTH AFFAIRS 125, 134 (1997) (reporting that by 
1997, approximately 75% of employer-sponsored health coverage was provided through managed 
care plans). 
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Thus, when Congress debated and ultimately enacted ERISA 
in 1974, “employee health benefits” still consisted primarily of 
traditional indemnity/fee-for-service insurance. The ensuing 
permutations of integrating health care finance and delivery, the 
on-going development of cost control strategies that influence if 
not dictate the provision of health care, and the predominance of 
employer sponsorship of health benefits were simply too 
embryonic to influence Congress’ design of ERISA in 1974.47
In the first decade following its enactment, litigants apparently 
thought so, too, as ERISA’s section 502 civil enforcement remedies 
and section 514’s “relate to” preemption clause peacefully co-
existed with both the application of state law and the emerging 
industry of managed health care.  In the earliest stage of managed 
care litigation, ERISA preemption was not even raised as a defense 
to state liability claims against HMOs or independent utilization 
reviewers for medical necessity determinations resulting in 
patient harm.
  If 
anything, enacting ERISA and the HMO Act in the same time 
frame shows that Congress intended HMOs to be subject to the 
same oversight that states traditionally exercise over health care 
issues in general and health insurance in particular. 
48  For example, the 1986 decision of Wickline v. State 
of California recognized the viability of a claim for an HMO’s 
negligent utilization review even though the facts did not support 
liability in that case.49  Two years later, the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court ruled in Boyd v. Albert Einstein Medical Center that an HMO 
may be vicariously liable for medical malpractice through 
ostensible agency where the patient looks primarily to the HMO 
for care.50  In the 1990 case of Wilson v. Blue Cross of Southern 
California, a claim for negligent utilization review was again 
permitted where utilization review denied coverage for an 
extended psychiatric hospitalization even though the treating 
physician deemed it medically necessary; the patient was 
discharged and committed suicide a few days later.51  The court 
reasoned that there was no reason, public policy or otherwise, to 
exempt a utilization review company from tort liability where its 
actions otherwise satisfied the elements of a negligence claim.52
In applying conventional tort principles to the relatively novel 
entities of HMOs, UR companies, and other managed care 
organizations, the early state court opinions did not even mention 
ERISA preemption.  Importing hospital liability principles into the 
 
 
 47. See Gruber et al., supra note 46. 
 48. Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
 49. Id. 
 50. 547 A.2d 1229, 1234-35 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). 
 51. 271 Cal. Rptr. 876, 878 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). 
 52. Id. at 884. 
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managed care context was just a typical example of how existing 
law evolves to address novel issues.  In fact, in some ways, the 
case for HMO liability based on ostensible agency theories seemed 
to be on even firmer ground than hospital vicarious liability.  
While a hospital often has no relationship with a patient prior to 
that patient’s entry, an HMO might enjoy years of a formal 
contractual relationship coupled with explicit documentary 
assertions of “caring” for the patient in the most literal sense of the 
word.  Nevertheless, despite the common sense appeal of holding 
HMOs to the same theories of institutional liability that govern 
other health care entities, this first stage of HMO liability litigation 
soon drew to a close when defendants reached back to a 1983 U.S. 
Supreme Court case that approved the use of an ERISA 
preemption defense in Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,53
Stage 2: The Schoolyard Bully – Broad “Relate to” Preemption 
Trumps State Law 
 and in so 
doing, unleashed the proverbial floodgate of litigation that has 
entangled state law ever since. 
By the early 1980’s, managed care was becoming the common 
mode of financing and delivering health benefits especially given 
relentless cost inflation since HMOs tended to achieve at least 
initial cost savings when switching from fee-for-service plans.54  
Consistent with the 1973 HMO Act’s directive that states could 
continue to regulate HMOs, states passed a variety of laws in 
response to managed care’s growing market penetration.55
This truly seismic shift was triggered by U.S. Supreme Court 
cases that had nothing to do with health benefits.  Basically, the 
Court accorded  514 preemption such a broad sweep that the 
statute seemed to displace almost any kind of state law.  
Interpreting section 514 in Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., the Court 
stated that a state law will “relate to” a plan and be preempted “if 
it has a connection with or reference to” an ERISA qualified 
  For a 
time, it seemed that HMO beneficiaries would enjoy the same 
rights and protections accorded those who were conventionally 
insured.  This quickly passed, though, once the innovative defense 
of ERISA section 514 “relate to” preemption protected the 
managed care industry from the reach of state regulators and 
individual litigants alike. 
 
 53. 463 U.S. 85 (1983). 
 54. See Humphrey Taylor & Michael Kagay, The HMO Report Card: A Closer Look, 5 HEALTH 
AFFAIRS 81, 84–85 (1986). 
 55. See generally Fred J. Hellinger, Any-Willing-Provider and Freedom of-Choice Laws: An Economic 
Assessment, 14 HEALTH AFFAIRS 297, 298 (1995). 
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benefit plan—as long as such claims were not “too tenuous.”56  
This broad and amorphous definition was soon invoked by a 
variety of defendants to evade all kinds of state laws on the 
ground that they had a “reference to” or were “connected with” 
an employee benefit plan.57
Thus, after over a decade of peaceful co-existence, ERISA now 
routinely preempted state laws simply because a benefits plan 
appeared somewhere in the case’s fact scenario.
 
58  This derailed 
state efforts to regulate a burgeoning managed care industry even 
though ERISA itself provided virtually no substantive regulation 
of employee health benefits.  “The ERISA vacuum” of regulation 
grew as state efforts to regulate managed care through any willing 
provider,59 or health care financing laws60 fell to “relate to” 
preemption.  Such successes led HMOs to assert preemption as a 
defense to almost any and all obligations imposed by state 
statutory or common law.  Nowhere was this literally more 
painful than in cases where an injured patient (or his estate) 
attempted to hold an HMO liable for a decision affecting medical 
treatment.  The seemingly straightforward application of existent 
tort principles to managed care that began in Wickline and 
Wilson,61
One of the earliest—and most troubling—examples of “relate 
to” preemption’s impact on patient care occurred in the 1992 case 
 had hit a dead end.  Patients were left with no redress for 
harm resulting from an HMO’s denial of care, providers had 
limited ability to enforce reimbursement contracts, and states were 
severely restricted in addressing HMO practices or more 
generalized health care issues. 
 
 56. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96–97 (1983). 
 57. See, e.g., id. at 97–98 (1983) (“A law ‘relates to’ an  employee benefit plan, in the normal 
sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan. Employing this 
definition, the [New York] Human Rights Law, which prohibits employers from structuring their 
employee benefit plans in a manner that discriminates on the basis of pregnancy, and the Disability 
Benefits Law, which requires employers to pay employees specific benefits, clearly ‘relate to’ benefit 
plans.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 58. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52–54 (1986) (preemption of suits 
alleging improper claims processing). 
 59. See, e.g., Stuart Circle Hosp. Corp. v. Aetna Health Mgmt., 800 F. Supp. 328, 334–35 (E.D.Va. 
1992), vacated and remanded, 995 F.2d 500, 505 (4th Cir. 1993) (District Court found that Virginia 
statute regarding HMO contracting with preferred provider organizations triggered “relate to” 
preemption since it regulated PPOs but did not qualify for saving clause protection.  Appeals Court 
reversed, reasoning that the law did relate to a plan, but qualified as state insurance regulation 
saved from preemption); Koch v. Mork Clinic, 540 N.W.2d 526, 531 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (relate to 
preemption of state collateral source rule). 
 60. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 721 (2d Cir. 1994), rev’d sub nom N.Y. State 
Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 668 (1995) (Court of 
Appeals found ERISA’s relate to clause preempted New York hospital surcharge statute due to 
economic impact on ERISA plans).  For a discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court’s reversal, see infra at 
notes 88–108 and accompanying text. 
 61. See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text. 
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of Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc.62  Blue Cross served as third 
party administrator for a self-insured employee health benefits 
plan and contracted with United HealthCare (“UHC”) to 
administer the plan’s “Quality Care” or utilization review 
program.63  UHC would assure delivery of “the most appropriate 
medical care” while eliminating “medically unnecessary 
treatment” along with the attendant financial costs and other risks 
of such treatment.64
Plaintiff’s obstetrician determined that the appropriate medical 
care for his patient, a woman in the third trimester of a high-risk 
pregnancy, was round-the-clock fetal monitoring in an acute care 
setting.
 
65  Only by providing monitoring under these 
circumstances, he reasoned, would it be possible to detect fetal 
distress and intervene immediately.  UHC disagreed, but did 
approve 10 hours of at-home fetal monitoring by a visiting nurse.  
Despite the efforts of the physician and his patient to secure more 
comprehensive care, UHC would only approve coverage for a 
treatment protocol that not only deviated from the physician’s 
recommendation, but also defied common sense.  Authorizing 10 
hours of daily monitoring acknowledged the need for fetal 
monitoring.  Yet, the protocol presumed that a fetus could 
somehow appreciate when it was being monitored, and confine 
any displays of distress to that period. Tragically, the fetus died 
while off-monitor.66  The family brought a wrongful death action 
in state court against Blue Cross and UHC for UHC’s negligent 
medical decision to deny hospitalization and constant fetal 
monitoring.67  They did not sue the obstetrician because he had 
vigorously advocated for inpatient care.68
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that UHC had made 
“a medical recommendation which—because of the financial 
ramifications—is more likely to be followed.”
 
69  However, since 
the allegedly negligent medical decision was part of “handling a 
benefit determination” it impermissibly related to a plan and thus 
was section 514 preempted.70
 
 62. 965 F.2d 1321, 1322 (5th Cir. 1992). 
  This sad but, in the court’s view, 
unavoidable result was not altered by “the traditional or non-
 63. Id. at 1323. 
 64. Id. (quoting plan documents). 
 65. Id. at 1322–23. 
 66. Id. at 1324. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1324–25.  Defendants asserted both section 514’s “relate to” preemption and diversity 
as grounds for removal.  The court stated that a “relate to” preemption defense would have been 
independently sufficient to establish jurisdiction.  Id. at 1325, n.4 (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66 (1987)). 
 69. Id. at 1332. 
 70. Id. 
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traditional nature of the state law” involved71 or the probability 
that Congress “could not have predicted” how ERISA preemption 
could affect utilization review decisions.72
A year later, in the 1993 decision of Kuhl v. Lincoln National 
Health Plan of Kansas City, Inc.,
  This effectively 
constructed a strong presumption in favor of preemption while 
denying plaintiffs any meaningful relief. 
73 section 514 was found to preempt 
a medical malpractice challenge to a plan’s seven-month delay in 
approving payment for an employee beneficiary’s heart surgery.  
Although the plan ultimately reversed its initial denial of 
coverage, the patient’s health had so seriously declined by then 
that he was no longer a candidate for the procedure and he died.  
In the same year, Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,74
Stage 3: Timeout – A Gradual Return to Traditional Preemption 
Analysis Intercepts ERISA’s Reach 
 reached a similar 
result when it held that ERISA’s broad “relate to” clause 
preempted a claim against an HMO for its refusal to approve a 
bone marrow transplant for a cancer patient.  Now, Corcoran’s 
presumption in favor of broad “relate to” preemption was 
becoming an increasingly impermeable shield, rendering state tort 
liability essentially meaningless for patients who had been 
harmed by their HMO’s growing involvement in medical 
decision-making. 
In addition to eviscerating state tort law, preemption similarly 
derailed state regulatory efforts to rein in health care cost inflation 
and cross-subsidize uncompensated care.  Travelers Insurance Co. v. 
Cuomo,75 for example, struck down a New York hospital rate 
setting statute that required hospitals to impose a series of 
surcharges on the bills of patients who were covered by 
commercial payers.76  Although the statute said nothing about 
ERISA benefit plans, it was successfully defeated on the ground 
that the statute impermissibly related to a plan by imposing 
indirect economic costs on it.77
 
 71. Id. at 1333–34. 
  Faced with a similar challenge to a 
similar New Jersey law, though, the Third Circuit broke ranks in 
United Wire, Metal, and Machine Health and Welfare Fund v. 
Morristown Memorial Hospital when it found that such broad 
 72. Id. at 1334. 
 73. 999 F.2d 298, 303 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 74. 11 F.3d 129, 131 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 75. 14 F.3d 708, 723 (2d Cir. 1994), rev’d sub nom N.Y. Conf. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995).  See infra, note 83 and accompanying text. 
 76. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW 2807-C (McKinney 1993). 
 77. Travelers Ins. Co., 14 F.3d at 718. 
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preemption violated ERISA’s underlying intent.78  It reasoned that 
a state law does not “relate to” a plan unless it specifically targets, 
or creates rights or restrictions predicated on the existence of such 
plans.79
Since most courts continued to find broad “relate to” 
preemption, United Wire remained an outlier until 1995 when the 
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari
  As conceptualized by the Third Circuit, a successful 
section 514 defense would need to show not only that the law had 
an effect on plans, but also that the effect created the type of 
interference with plan administration that Congress intended to 
preempt. 
80 to resolve the conflict 
between the hospital rate setting rulings of the Second Circuit in 
Travelers v. Cuomo81 and the Third Circuit in United Wire.82  In 
ruling against preemption,83 it could have adopted the United Wire 
test—that only laws that specifically target or predicate rights and 
restrictions on the existence of ERISA plans are “relate to” 
preempted.84  Instead, it chose to return to a conventional 
preemption analysis in order to clarify what was becoming an 
increasingly confusing area of the law.  Critiquing section 514’s 
structural complexity and textual ambiguity85 it also 
acknowledged that its past rulings had further complicated 
matters.  Consequently, the Court found it necessary to spell out 
the mechanics of “relate to” analysis, beginning with “a starting 
presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state 
law”86 particularly in areas traditionally left to state control.87
The Court stated unequivocally that such laws are preempted 
only if it is “the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”
 
88  State 
laws that expressly reference an ERISA plan directly conflict with 
ERISA’s text and thus are preempted by section 514.89
 
 78. 995 F.2d 1179, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993), reversing 793 F. Supp. 524, 542 (D.N.J. 1992). 
  In Travelers, 
though, there was no “reference” since the New York statute did 
not mention ERISA plans.  To determine whether it had a 
 79. Id. at 1192. 
 80. 513 U.S. 920 (1994). 
 81. 14 F.3d 708, 725 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 82. 995 F.2d 1179, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 83. 514 U.S. 645, 654 (1995). That the issue had great importance beyond these two cases was 
evidenced by the amici curiae briefs filed separately by a dozen states and the National Governor’s 
Association in support of upholding the New York statute, along with a variety of large trade 
groups such as the Group Health Association of America, Inc. and the Federation of American 
Health Systems, which favored preempting it. 
 84. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 85. It observed: “[if] ‘relate to’ were taken to the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy, then for 
all practical purposes preemption would never run its course, for ‘[r]eally, universally, relations 
stop nowhere.” 514 U.S. at 655. 
 86. Id. at 654–55 (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981)). 
 87. Blue Cross, 514 U.S. at 655. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 656. 
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sufficient “connection” with ERISA plans, the Court needed to “go 
beyond the unhelpful text and the frustrating difficulty of defining 
its key term, and look instead to the objectives of the ERISA 
statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress 
understood would survive.”90  That ERISA was intended to secure 
“nationally uniform administration of employee benefit plans” 
did not negate the presumption against preemption here because 
the rate setting law fell within the state’s traditional area of health 
care oversight.91  What Congress did intend was to protect plan 
administrators from inconsistent and interfering state regulations,  
and thus must have intended “relate to” to displace those state 
laws which would overtly or effectively regulate actual plan 
administration.  Accordingly, section 514 preempts laws that 
directly mandate or indirectly bind the choices of plan 
administrators or otherwise interfere with uniform plan 
administration.92  The New York surcharge statute, however, only 
imposed an indirect economic cost on plans, which could affect—
but would not bind—the plans’ “shopping decisions” concerning 
the administration and delivery of benefits.93  The Court could 
find no evidence that “Congress chose to displace [such] general 
health care regulation, which historically has been a matter of 
local concern”94 especially since such measures existed when 
ERISA was enacted.95  As a result, the New York’s rate setting law 
would remain in effect.96
The Supreme Court’s more conventional and restrictive 
approach to “relate to” preemption continued in California Division 
of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham, where it rejected 
ERISA preemption of a state labor law, and again emphasized that 
courts must presume that Congress would not override state 
police powers absent clear evidence of an intent to do so.
 
97  In 
DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Medical & Clinical Service Fund98 where it 
found that a state tax on both ERISA-funded and non-ERISA 
funded health care providers was simply “one of ‘a myriad state 
laws’ of general applicability that impose[d] some burdens on the 
administration of ERISA plans but nevertheless [did] not ‘relate 
to’ them within the meaning of the statute.”99
 
 90. Id. 
  For a short time, the 
Travelers-Dillingham-DeBuono trilogy encouraged state legislators, 
 91. Id. at 657. 
 92. Id. at 658–59. 
 93. Id. at 660. 
 94. Id. at 661 (citations omitted). 
 95. Id. at 665. 
 96. Id. at 668. 
 97. 519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997). 
 98. 520 U.S. 806, 816 (1997). 
 99. Id. at 815. 
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providers, and patients to believe that: (1) courts were now better 
equipped to resolve “relate to” preemption challenges with 
consistency and predictability; and (2) managed care 
organizations could no longer use section 514 to evade their 
responsibilities under state law.  But it was only for a short time. 
 
Stage 4: [Complete vs. Conflict Preemption] + [Quality vs. 
Quantity] = Dazed & Confused 
The plaintiff’s bar enthusiastically embraced Travelers, 
believing that negligence claims for medical decision making 
would now survive preemption since common law negligence is 
even more traditionally “state” than hospital rate setting statutes.  
However, Travelers’ apparent restriction of section 514 “conflict” 
preemption regarding state oversight of “quality” catalyzed a shift 
to section 502 “complete” preemption of a plan’s “quantity” or 
coverage determinations.  It soon became apparent that the 
Supreme Court’s attempt to forge a clear path through the 
minefield of section 514 preemption ironically had only made 
things worse. 
The confusion began a month later when the Third Circuit 
rejected section 502 complete preemption of medical decision 
making claims in Dukes v. United States Healthcare, Inc.100  
Previously, removing state tort claims to federal court on section 
514 conflict preemption grounds happened routinely.101  The 
federal district court typically dismissed the removed claims as 
section 514 preempted because “the treatment received must be 
measured against the benefit plan” and, for an ERISA plan, such 
claims necessarily related to that plan.102
To remove a state claim to federal court, the defendant bears 
the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction.
  Once again, though, the 
Third Circuit saw things quite differently, this time by finding no 
section 514 removal jurisdiction. 
103
 
 100. 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995).  The decision overruled the consolidated cases of Dukes v. U.S. 
Health Care Sys. Inc., 848 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1994) which had asserted a wrongful death case 
against an HMO for its failure to perform certain blood tests, and Visconti v. U.S. Health Care Sys., 
Inc., 857 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Pa. 1994) which concerned direct and vicarious liability claims for 
negligence in selecting providers and delivering care. 
  Under the “well-
pleaded complaint rule,” the federal district court should confine 
itself to the face of the complaint in determining whether federal 
 101. See, e.g., Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1331 (discussed supra note 62); Nealy v. U.S. Healthcare HMO, 
844 F. Supp. 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
 102. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 351.  Remaining claims were then remanded to state court. Dukes, 848 F. 
Supp. at 42. 
 103. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a), 1446(a).  The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that removal 
statutes do not create independent grounds for federal jurisdiction and should be strictly construed. 
See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108–09 (1941). 
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jurisdiction exists.104  A state claim normally will not support 
federal jurisdiction unless Congress intended federal law to 
supplant it.  Such instances of “complete” preemption—which 
include ERISA’s section 502—create federal question jurisdiction 
and allow removal from state to federal court.105  Before Dukes, 
HMOs had routinely used section 514 to remove state cases to 
federal courts,106 but now,  the Third Circuit reasoned that section 
514’s “relate to” clause involved conflict rather than complete 
preemption and thus did not confer federal question jurisdiction.  
Complete preemption under section 502’s civil enforcement 
provisions would have supported removal had plaintiffs 
complained of improper withholding or processing of plan 
benefits.107
The case could have ended there, but the Third Circuit went on 
in dicta to untangle the “quality” and “quantity” components of 
managed care decisions despite the Fifth Circuit’s belief in 
Corcoran that the two were inseparable.  Rather than criticize 
Corcoran for improperly finding “relate to” preemption of an 
essentially medical and, therefore, quality decision,
  A section 514 conflict preemption defense to a state 
law claim would not create federal jurisdiction because state 
courts are just as qualified as their federal counterparts to resolve 
conflict preemption disputes. 
108 the Dukes 
court stated that contesting the prospective utilization review in 
Corcoran amounted to a completely preempted challenge to a 
section 502 benefits determination.  In contrast, Dukes involved 
claims of negligent provision of care, not improper claims 
processing or benefits determinations. This distinction was a bit 
too facile since even Corcoran conceded that the HMO decisions 
being challenged were medical ones.109
Coming so soon after Travelers’ renewed regard for state 
oversight of health care quality issues, Dukes’ bright line 
distinctions between section 514 vs. section 502 preemption, and 
  Nevertheless, the Dukes 
court concluded that a preemption challenge to the medical claims 
before it could only be grounded in section 514’s “relate to” clause 
and, therefore, belonged in state court absent independent 
grounds for federal jurisdiction. 
 
 104. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1983). 
 105. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63–64 (1987). 
 106. See, e.g., Corcoran, discussed supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 107. In that instance, equitable relief under § 502(a) to recover benefits, enforce rights, or clarify 
future rights under the terms of the plan would still be available after exhausting administrative 
remedies under the plan (even though equitable or declaratory relief is often futile post-injury).  See 
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a); Turner v. Fallon Comty. Health Plan, Inc., 127 F.3d 196, 198 (1st Cir. 1997); 
Belanger v. Healthsource of Me., 66 F. Supp. 2d 70, 73 (D. Me. 1999). 
 108. See infra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 109. Compare discussion of Corcoran’s treatment of medical decision making, supra note 62 and 
accompanying text. 
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“quality” vs. “quantity,” had a huge and immediate impact on 
ERISA jurisprudence.110  In theory, the courts seemed poised to 
retreat from Corcoran and return to the early Wickline days when a 
UR decision to override or delay care might be actionable under 
state negligence law.111
An early example was Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc. in 
which both section 502 and section 514 blocked claims against an 
HMO and its UR nurse for failing to authorize physical therapy 
following knee surgery.
  In reality, the Travelers’ and Dukes’ efforts 
at analytical clarity unleashed a deluge of inconsistent opinions as 
the bright line devolved to a blur. 
112  Because the nurse was administering 
the plan, section 502 completely preempted the negligence claim 
against her as well as the vicarious liability claim against the 
HMO for her UR decision.113
[T]he preemptive force of ERISA is so powerful that it converts “a 
state law claim into an action arising under federal law,”
  In the court’s view: 
114 even if the 
plaintiff does not want relief under ERISA. [citation omitted] This is 
true even though the same facts might be sufficient to state a state law 
cause of action for negligence.115
In addition, section 514 preempted vicarious liability claims 
against the HMO for the treating physician’s negligent treatment 
because, in actuality, the claims were rooted in the failure to treat 
due to the plan’s denial of benefits.
 
116  Consequently, plaintiff 
would have to look to section 502 for equitable relief even if it 
offered too little too late.117
At this time, Dukes still seemed to be on solid ground since, 
having decided the Travelers-Dillingham-DeBuono trilogy, the 
Supreme Court’s 1997 decision in Boggs v. Boggs continued to 
underscore its return to traditional preemption analysis—and 
attendant respect for the preeminence of state law in certain 
contexts.
 
118  While not a health benefits case, the 5-4 Boggs decision 
is notable since both the majority and dissent reduced a 
potentially complex “relate to” challenge of a Louisiana 
testamentary transfer statute119
 
 110. 57 F.3d at 361. 
 to a simple inquiry into whether 
 111. See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text. 
 112. 88 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 113. Id. at 1485. 
 114. Id. at 1490 (quoting Metro. Life Insur. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 64 (1987)). 
 115. Id. (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 66–67). 
 116. Id. at 1493–94. 
 117. Id. at 1495. 
 118. 520 U.S. 833 (1997). 
 119. LA CIV. CODE ANN. art. 535 (2008).  The law permitted a non-plan participating spouse to 
make a testamentary transfer of her interest in her husband's undistributed pension plan benefits.  
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Congress intended ERISA to supplant this type of state law.  The 
majority found section 514 preemption due to a “direct clash” 
between ERISA and the Louisiana provision.120  Maintaining 
Travelers’ focus on congressional intent, the dissent found no 
preemption given no evidence that Congress intended to preempt 
the traditionally state-regulated issues of domestic relations and 
community property law that were at the core of the case.121
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s seemingly restrictive 
view of preemption, the lower courts continued to struggle – and 
differ – in distinguishing quality from quantity and section 502 
from section 514 in Turner v. Fallon Community Health Plan, Inc.
 
122 
and Bast v. Prudential Insurance Company of America.123  Each case 
sought damages for the death of a spouse allegedly caused by the 
plan’s refusal to approve an autologous bone marrow transplant. 
Denial of coverage was based on the plan-wide package of 
benefits – what Dukes would characterize as administrative 
determinations regarding the “quantum of benefits” – rather than 
denying or delaying a covered benefit for a particular patient as 
occurred in Dukes and Corcoran. Turner and Bast agreed that 
ERISA preempted plaintiffs’ claims, but differed as to why and 
how. In Turner, the First Circuit found that section 502 completely 
preempted damage claims because the plan documents excluded 
the treatment as unproven for solid tumors.  Accordingly, relief 
could only be obtained through section 502 even though its focus 
on equitable relief provided no meaningful remedies.124  In Bast, 
the Ninth Circuit also found preemption – but this time under 
section 514’s “relate to” clause.125  Even though purely equitable 
relief has little meaning after a patient’s death, the court also 
rejected plaintiff’s argument that damages should be available 
under section 502’s civil enforcement remedies.126
At the same time, a completely different result obtained in 
Pappas v. Asbel
 
127
 
A man’s first wife predeceased him and bequeathed her interest to her sons.  He remarried and, 
upon his death, his new wife claimed his retirement benefits.  The sons from his first marriage 
contested this, claiming that those benefits were theirs by virtue of their mother's prior testamentary 
transfer under the Louisiana statute.  The second wife argued that section 514 preempted the law 
and a 5-4 majority agreed. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 854. 
 when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 873–74.  The Court’s fealty to Travelers was again demonstrated in Unum Life 
Insurance Company of America v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 375–76 (1999), which unanimously ruled that 
California's notice-prejudice rule was saved from ERISA preemption despite conflicting with 
ERISA's substantive provisions since disuniformities are the inevitable result of Congress' intent to 
save insurance regulation from relate to preemption. 
 122. 127 F.3d 196 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 123. 150 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 124. 127 F.3d at 199. 
 125. 150 F.3d at 1008. 
 126. Id. at 1010. 
 127. 724 A.2d 889 (Pa. 1998). 
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preemption of a state medical malpractice challenge to an HMO’s 
delay in authorizing an emergency hospital transfer.128  The trial 
court had found section 514 preemption since the transfer delay 
was an administrative decision.129  The intermediate appeals court 
reversed, explaining that negligence law is a form of state 
oversight in matters of health quality130 which, at most, has only 
an indirect economic impact that survives preemption under 
Travelers.131 The state supreme court affirmed, reasoning that the 
transfer delay was “indisputably [] intertwined with the provision 
of safe medical care” and Congress never intended “to preempt 
state laws concerning the regulation of the provision of safe 
medical care.”132  It nevertheless recognized the quantity 
implications of denying transfer to a particular hospital, 
acknowledging “there will be a financial impact on HMOs. Yet, 
that is not enough to countermand the conclusion that these 
claims are not preempted.”133
Cases such as Turner, Bast, and Pappas showed just how 
important judicial characterization of a claim had become to the 
ultimate resolution of an ERISA preemption challenge. 
Increasingly, surviving complete and/or conflict preemption now 
required winning the battle of semantics.  This reflected the 
deeper problem of expecting black and white labels to capture so 
many shades of gray.  Despite its conceptual appeal, the Dukes 
approach of bifurcating “quality” from “quantity,” and “medical” 
from “administrative” decisions is often too difficult to implement 
in a given fact scenario.
  For the Pappas court, the enmeshed 
quality and administrative aspects of a plaintiff’s claim were not 
enough to warrant section 514 preemption, although many courts 
had already disagreed. 
134
 
 128. After receiving steroid injections for neck and shoulder pain from his internist, Mr. Pappas 
experienced numbness in his chest, abdomen, and limbs and could not walk. At the community 
hospital ER, Dr. Asbel detected a cervical epidural abscess compressing the spinal cord which 
warranted immediate transfer to  Jefferson Hospital’s spinal cord trauma unit.  The HMO denied 
authorization for a transfer to Jefferson, but approved transfer to three other hospitals.  Dr. Asbel 
and the community hospital’s neurosurgeon made several requests to speak with the HMO 
physician, but they were only permitted to speak with the HMO’s administrative personnel.  Mr. 
Pappas was ultimately transported to the Medical College of Pennsylvania Hospital, but he became 
paralyzed.  In addition to malpractice claims against Asbel and the community hospital, Pappas 
sued his HMO, claiming that “negligence in causing an inordinate delay in transferring him to a 
facility equipped and immediately able to address the neurological emergency” exacerbated the 
spinal compression, and resulted in quadriplegia.  675 A.2d 711, 713-14 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 169 (citing Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825, 833 (1988)). 
 131. Id. at 171–72. 
 132. Pappas, 724 A.2d at 893. 
 133. Id. at 894. In addition, disputing the lower court’s contention that Congress could not have 
intended ERISA to preempt challenges to HMO cost-containment, it observed that enacting the 
Federal HMO Act just one year before ERISA showed that Congress did indeed understand 
managed care. Id. at 893. 
 134. See, e.g., Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2003) (state tort claim based on mixed eligibility 
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The limits of Dukes’s quality versus quantity and section 502 
versus section 514 distinctions are highlighted in Danca v. Private 
Health Care Systems, Inc. involving pre-certification of psychiatric 
hospitalization, but denial of the particular hospital and program 
requested.135  After being treated at the approved hospital, the 
plaintiff patient was released, attempted suicide by drug 
overdose, was re-hospitalized at another facility, and again 
attempted suicide—this time by self-immolation which disfigured 
over 45% of her body and destroyed the fingers on both hands.136  
The case was removed to federal district court where plaintiff 
argued that her negligent pre-certification claim went to the 
quality of benefits delivered since treatment was not denied 
outright; defendants countered that choosing a specific hospital 
was precisely the kind of administrative decision that Congress 
intended to protect through preemption.137  The district court 
found section 514 preemption because challenging a benefits 
determination impermissibly relates to plan administration.138  
The First Circuit preempted under both section 502 and section 
514.  In its view, “quasi-medical” UR decisions are “indisputably” 
part of benefits determinations,139 making a negligence challenge a 
section 502 preempted alternative enforcement mechanism and a 
section 514 conflicting state law.140
In contrast to Danca’s refusal to recognize HMO negligence, 
the Third Circuit in Bauman v. U.S. Healthcare permitted a 
negligence challenge to a plan’s maternity length of stay policy 
since it affected quality of care.
 
141
 
decisions not completely preempted). 
  It explained that, independent 
of its administrative tasks (such as accounting and record 
 135. 185 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999).  The plaintiff had a long history of mental illness, was acutely 
psychotic, and her physician recommended that she be admitted to McLean Hospital where she had 
been treated successfully in the past.  The utilization reviewer denied this request and pre-certified 
her for Emerson Hospital, which did not offer the particular therapy available at McLean.  Id. at 3. 
 136. Id. at 2–4.  See also Danca v. Emerson Hosp., 9 F. Supp. 2d 27, 32 (D. Mass. 1998). 
 137. Danca, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 31–32. 
 138. Id.  The federal district judge urged patients to be more proactive in invoking section 502’s 
civil enforcement provisions if initially displeased with a plan’s refusal to comply with the treating 
physician’s determination of medical necessity.  In doing so, the judge showed little appreciation 
for the logistical difficulties of, and disincentives to mounting a legal challenge in the midst of an 
urgent medical situation where the law itself poses little likelihood of success given its limitation of 
remedies and standard of judicial deference to plan decisions. 
 139. Danca, 185 F.3d at 5–6 (citations omitted). 
 140. Id. at 17.  Further examples of an HMO’s individual treatment decisions triggering either 
section 502 and/or section 514 preemption are numerous and include Tolton v. America Biodyne, 
Inc., 48 F.3d 937 (6th Cir. 1995) (section 514 preemption of state claims based on HMO’s denial of 
inpatient care to suicidal patient); Lancaster v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 958 F. Supp. 1137 
(E.D. Va. 1997) (section 502 preemption of negligence claims regarding referrals and testing). 
 141. 193 F.3d at 156–57. Future U.S. Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito concurred in the 
Lancaster court’s reflection that the “most significant contribution” of its prior decision in Dukes was 
its distinction between the quality and quantum of benefits. Id. at 161–62 (citing Dukes, 57 F.3d at 
357–58). 
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keeping),142 a plan acts as a “a health care provider” in arranging 
and delivering medical treatment “directly or through contracts 
with hospitals, doctors, or nurses.”143  Thus, section 502 
completely preempts claims that seek to enforce or clarify benefits 
due, but not “state-law claims directed to the quality of benefits 
provided.”144  Challenging the quality of care instead of the 
quantum of benefits rested on “the HMO’s essentially medical 
determination of the appropriate level of care”145 and therefore 
survived section 502 complete preemption.146
Patients were not just concerned about managed care’s quasi-
medical role in authorizing care; they also challenged the use of 
financial decisions to influence provider decisions regarding 
diagnostic testing, treatment, and referrals.  These were harder 
cases since financial incentives were at least facially the kind of 
administrative decision protected by preemption.  Yet, some 
courts found that even these can survive complete and conflict 
preemption when sufficiently integrated with the quality of care 
provided.  In Stewart v. Berry Family Health Center,
 
147 for example, 
section 502 did not completely preempt a claim that the HMO’s 
“financial incentives and cost control systems were the direct and 
proximate cause” of inadequate diagnosis and treatment. 148 The 
court stated that the claim’s “proper characterization . . . is highly 
important”149 because section 502 does not preempt a claim for 
wrongful denial of benefits.150  Instead, financial incentives that 
allegedly “affected the standard of care,”151 are “more properly 
characterized as challenging a [non-section 502 preempted] 
medical decision to deny proper treatment to a patient rather than 
an administrative decision to deny benefits.”152
 
 142. “As an administrator overseeing an ERISA plan, an HMO will have administrative 
responsibilities over the elements of the plan, including determining eligibility for benefits, 
calculating those benefits, disbursing them to the participant, monitoring available funds, and 
keeping records. As we held in Dukes, claims that fall within the essence of the administrator's 
activities in this regard fall within section 502(a)(1)(B) and are completely preempted.” Id. at 162. 
  Plus, there was no 
section 514 “relate to” preemption as the HMO-provider 
 143. Id. (citing both Dukes, 57 F.3d at 361, and Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1329–34, for the point that 
HMOs act as both health care providers and plan administrators). 
 144. Id. at 161–62 (citing Dukes, 57 F.3d at 356). 
 145. Id. at 163. 
 146. Id. at 164; accord Crum v. Health-Alliance Midwest, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1016 (C.D. Ill. 
1999) (plan’s policy of requiring pre-approval from an advisory nurse before using the emergency 
room was sufficiently medical in nature to constitute the kind of quality claim that survives 
preemption).  See also Napoletano v. Cigna Healthcare, 680 A.2d 127 (Conn. 1996); Smith v. HMO 
Great Lakes, 852 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 
 147. 105 F. Supp. 2d 807 (S.D. Ohio 2000). 
 148. Id. at 811. 
 149. Id. at 812. 
 150. Id. at 815. 
 151. Id. at 813. 
 152. Id. at 815. 
2010] Drawing Lines in Shifting Sands 117 
relationship “does not rest upon the terms of the plan . . . .”153
That patients prevailed in Stewart, Pappas and the Third 
Circuit’s cases only compounded the unpredictability of deciding 
whether and how to litigate these claims.  In other jurisdictions, 
most patients lost and increasingly did because of section 502.  
There had to be a better way to enforce patients’ rights if ERISA 
was going to render so many kinds of state laws inoperative.  And 
in Stage Five, the plaintiffs’ bar was about to look for it by 
reasoning that, if ERISA truly supplanted all state claims, then 
ERISA’s own civil enforcement scheme must  provide some sort of 
redress to those injured by an HMO’s decision.  Although this 
tactic ultimately failed, it launched a renewed respect for state 
law. But this too, did not last long. 
 
Stage 5: Offense as Defense – Seeking ERISA Remedies as an End-
Run Around Preemption. 
Since HMOs had enjoyed so much success in using complete 
and conflict preemption to avoid state jurisdiction and evade 
liability under state common and statutory law, patients decided 
to look to ERISA itself for relief. One strategy was to focus on an 
HMO’s use of financial incentives and UR practices to reduce 
treatments and referrals.  The U.S. Supreme Court appeared to 
light the way in its 1996 holding in Varity Corp. v. Howe154 that 
breach of fiduciary obligation claims are actionable under section 
502(a)(3)’s provision for “other equitable relief,” and its 1999 
decision in Humana Inc. v. Forsyth155 that RICO156 actions could be 
brought against insurance companies.  At the same time, a well-
organized group of plaintiffs’ attorneys were winding down their 
lucrative state Medicaid reimbursement litigation against the 
tobacco industry.  Flush with cash and primed with experience in 
using class-action litigation to circumvent evidentiary problems of 
individual causation, they turned their attention and resources to 
holding HMOs accountable for patient harms.157
The self-described “REPAIR” team
 
158
 
 153. Id. 
 and like-minded litigants 
asserted a variety of claims, including RICO violations and breach 
of ERISA fiduciary obligations, based on the HMOs’ inadequate 
disclosure of the impact of financial incentives and other cost 
control techniques on the delivery of quality health care.  RICO’s 
 154. 516 U.S. 489 (1996). 
 155. 525 U.S. 299, 311 (1999). 
 156. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq. (2006). 
 157. See, e.g., Laurie McGinley & Milo Geyelin, Attorneys Prepare Suits Against HMOs, WALL ST. 
J., Sept. 30, 1999, at A3. 
 158. Id. 
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promise as an alternative basis for relief was short-lived when 
Maio v. Aetna, Inc. rejected claims that Aetna violated RICO by 
fraudulently advertising its commitment to quality health care 
when it was instead devoted to fiscal constraints.159Aetna’s quality 
assurance advertisements were deemed obvious puffery that 
could not support a fraud count.160  Plus, any injury was “too 
hypothetical” and unsupported by a showing of proximate 
cause.161
Claiming breach of ERISA disclosure obligations produced 
mixed results.  Drolet v. Healthsource recognized an ERISA-
imposed fiduciary obligation to inform patients of physicians’ 
financial incentives to contain treatment and referrals in denying 
defendant’s motion to dismiss.
 
162  In Shea v. Esensten, the Eighth 
Circuit recognized a similar duty resulting in the settlement of 
several claims.163  In contrast, Weiss v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc. 
found no ERISA fiduciary obligation to disclose financial 
incentives.164
Weiss foreshadowed the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2000 death knell 
to using section 502 remedies to circumvent preemption problems 
in Pegram v. Herdrich.
 
165  There, the patient claimed that her 
physician-owned HMO’s financial incentive plan induced 
physicians to provide less care than medically necessary in breach 
of ERISA’s fiduciary obligations—in this case, a delayed 
ultrasound that led to a ruptured appendix.166  Thus, the Pegram 
Court had to decide whether treatment decisions made by an 
HMO acting through its treating physicians are fiduciary acts 
under ERISA.167  Ruling that such “mixed treatment and eligibility 
decisions”168 are not fiduciary in nature,169
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Souter acknowledged 
 it effectively found that 
ERISA itself would continue to provide little help in filling the gap 
caused by sections 502 and 514 preemption of state remedies. 
 
 159. No. 99-1969, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15056, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 1999). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at *7. 
 162. 968 F. Supp. 757, 760 (D.N.H. 1997). 
 163. 107 F.3d 625, 628 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 164. 972 F. Supp. 748, 754 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 165. 530 U.S. 211 (2000). 
 166. Mrs. Herdrich sought treatment from Lori Pegram, M.D., a Carle physician, for abdominal 
pain.  She was sent home and returned six days later with a palpable inflamed mass in her 
abdomen.  Rather than arrange for an immediate ultrasound examination at a local hospital, Dr. 
Pegram scheduled her patient for an ultrasound at a facility staffed by Carle even though it would 
entail a one-week delay and fifty mile trip.  Before that ultrasound was administered, Mrs. 
Herdrich’s appendix ruptured, causing acute peritonitis and a week-long stay in the hospital.  At 
trial, ERISA’s preemption of her state fraud count led her to reframe her claim under ERISA’s 
fiduciary requirements.  Id. at 215-16. 
 167. Id. at 219. 
 168. Id. at 229. 
 169. Id. at 237. 
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that under both fee-for-service medicine and managed care, 
physicians face financial incentives that influence their treatment 
decisions.170  An “inducement to ration”171 is an inevitable feature 
of any risk-bearing managed care plan but only the legislature, not 
the courts, can make the complex policy choices in setting 
appropriate tradeoff levels of risks and costs.172  Further, ERISA 
does not support a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against an 
HMO acting through its treating physicians where the physician’s 
“eligibility decision and the treatment decision were inextricably 
mixed, as they are in countless medical administrative decisions 
every day.”173
The Pegram Court clarified that, under ERISA, an HMO is not 
an employee welfare benefit plan; rather, the plan is embodied by 
the agreement between the HMO and the employer by which the 
employer agrees to pay premiums and the parties establish “rules 
under which beneficiaries will be entitled to care.”
 
174  Under 
ERISA, an HMO can only breach a fiduciary duty if acting as a 
plan fiduciary.175
An HMO can make: 1) “pure eligibility decisions turn[ing] on 
the plan’s coverage of a particular condition or medical procedure 
for its treatment;”
  Consequently, financial incentives that place a 
physician’s economic self-interest in reducing care at odds with 
his patient’s need for services do not necessarily constitute a 
breach of fiduciary responsibilities under ERISA. 
176 or 2) pure treatment decisions, entailing 
choices about the appropriate medical response in terms of 
diagnosis and treatment “given a patient’s constellation of 
symptoms . . . .”177  However, the Court emphasized that HMOs 
can wear two hats at a time with different categories of decisions 
becoming “practically inextricable from one another”178
 
 170. Id. at 219.  The Court noted that managed care’s cost control techniques evolved in direct 
response to the fee-for-service incentive and stated that the check on any system of financial 
incentives is “the professional obligation to provide covered services with a reasonable degree of 
skill and judgment in the patient’s interest.”  Id. (citing Brief for American Medical Association as 
amicus curiae 17–21). 
 forming a 
third category of mixed eligibility and treatment decisions.  In the 
 171. Id. at 221. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 229. 
 174. Id. at 223.  An ERISA fiduciary “must be someone acting in the capacity of manager, 
administrator, or financial adviser” to such a plan.  Id. at 222.  An HMO can become an ERISA 
fiduciary if it administers the plan, i.e., the agreement between the employer and the HMO to 
finance and deliver health benefits to employee plan participants and their beneficiaries.  Id. at 223. 
 175. Id. at 226 (observing that since ERISA does not dictate the creation or design of benefits 
plans, an employer’s decisions about either “are not themselves fiduciary acts”) (citing Lockheed 
Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 887 (1996) ("Nothing in ERISA requires employers to establish 
employee benefit plans. Nor does ERISA mandate what kind of benefit employers must provide if 
they choose to have such a plan.")). 
 176. Id. at 228. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
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Court’s view, pure eligibility decisions involve “fiduciary 
administrative functions” that Congress intended to be subject to 
section 502 civil enforcement provisions for breach of fiduciary 
obligation.179  In contrast, pure treatment decisions as well as 
mixed eligibility and treatment decisions resemble typical 
physician treatment decisions.  The Court doubted that Congress 
intended these to be actionable as fiduciary claims, especially 
given Congress’s preoccupation with pension plan funding and 
mismanagement when it enacted ERISA.180
Uncertainty regarding Congress’s preemptive intent should 
have been enough to resolve the issue given the strong 
presumption against preemption demanded by Travelers.
 
181  Here, 
however, any doubt regarding Congress’ intent to exclude mixed 
decisions from administrative fiduciary ones “hardens into 
conviction” because an ERISA claim for breach of fiduciary duties 
would merely duplicate “the law already available in state courts 
and federal diversity actions today . . . .”182  As a result, an HMO’s 
mixed eligibility and treatment decision cannot be challenged 
under ERISA as a breach of fiduciary obligation.183
As a straightforward request for section 502 remedies, Pegram 
was not a preemption case per se although it occurred because 
sections 502 and 514 had preempted so many state remedies 
despite Travelers’ return to traditional preemption analysis.
 
184  
While Pegram ruled for the HMO, its rationale held great promise 
for patients since reading it together with the Travelers trilogy and 
Boggs suggested that mixed treatment–eligibility decisions should 
be actionable under state tort law.185
 
 179. Id. at 232. 
  However, any such hope for 
plaintiffs was dashed by Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 
 180. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 93-127, 5 (1973); S. REP. NO. 93-383, 17 (1973)). 
 181. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 182. Id. at 232. 
 183. Id. at 237.  The Pegram Court concluded its opinion with a stinging attack on plaintiff, 
finding that this was actually a much easier call than Travelers: 
To be sure, [Travelers] throws some cold water on the preemption theory; there, 
we held that, in the field of health care, a subject of traditional state regulation, 
there is no ERISA preemption without clear manifestation of congressional 
purpose.  But in that case the convergence of state and federal law was not so 
clear as in the situation we are positing; the state-law standard had not been 
subsumed by the standard to be applied under ERISA.  We could struggle with 
this problem, but first it is well to ask, again, what would be gained by opening 
the federal courthouse doors for a fiduciary malpractice claim, save for possibly 
random fortuities such as more favorable scheduling, or the ancillary 
opportunity to seek attorney’s fees.  And again, we know that Congress had no 
such haphazard boons in prospect when it defined the ERISA fiduciary, nor 
such a risk to the efficiency of federal courts as a new fiduciary malpractice 
jurisdiction would pose in welcoming such unheard-of fiduciary litigation. 
Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 237 (2000). 
 184. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
 185. See supra notes 83-98, 118 and accompanying text. 
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which actually found for the patient but incentivized plans to self 
insure in order to evade state liability.186 Aetna 
Health Inc. v. Davila
  And in 2004’s 
,187
Rush Prudential v. Moran involved Illinois’ statutory 
requirement of external review for managed care coverage denials 
based on medical necessity determinations.
 Pegram’s early patient-protective 
implications evaporated entirely, leaving both patients and state 
legislators with a severe case of judicial vertigo. 
188  As he had in 
Pegram, Justice Souter wrote for the majority, and explained that 
although the additional layer of review related to employee 
benefit plans,189 it was saved from section 514 preemption as a 
state insurance measure.190  The defense argued that HMOs are 
health care providers, not insurers,191 but the Court disagreed, 
describing an HMO as “both: it provides health care, and it does 
so as an insurer.”192  Further, the federal 1973 HMO Act’s text and 
legislative history showed that Congress has always 
conceptualized HMOs as performing the essential insurance 
functions of spreading and bearing risk. 193  Ensuing changes in 
managed care products and risk transfer methods will not prevent 
states from regulating HMOs in their traditional oversight of the 
insurance industry.194  The Court also clarified that since the three 
McCarron-Ferguson criteria used to determine savings clause 
protection195 were only “guideposts,” a state law could be saved 
without satisfying all of them.196  The Illinois law met at least 
two.197
The HMO countered that even if saved under section 514, the 
law could still be completely preempted by section 502 for 
disrupting ERISA’s goal of uniformity and creating enforcement 
mechanisms not included in section 502’s civil remedies scheme.
 
198
 
 186. 536 U.S. 355 (2002). 
  
 187. 542 U.S. 200 (2004); see infra note 21027 and accompanying text. 
 188. 536 U.S. at 362 (addressing the Health Maintenance Organization Act, 215 ILL. COMP. STAT., 
125, §§ 4-10 (2000).  Having obtained a favorable external review, plaintiff sued her HMO to 
reimburse her for the previously denied $95,000 microneurolysis surgery.). 
 189. Id. at 365. 
 190. Id. at 373. 
 191. Id. at 366. 
 192. Id. at 367. 
 193. Id. at 368 (citing Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 § 1301(c), 87 Stat. 916, 
codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300e(c) (1994); S. REP. NO. 93-129, at 14 (1973)). 
 194. Id. at 370-371. That today HMOs typically try to shift risk to the provider through capitation 
or other means did not dissuade the Court from this result. Id. at 372-73 (observing “that HMOs are 
not traditional ‘indemnity’ insurers is no matter; we would not undertake to freeze the concepts of 
'insurance' . . . into the mold they fitted when these Federal Acts were passed[,]’") (quoting SEC v. 
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65, 71 (1959)). 
 195. Id. at 373. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 373-75. 
 198. Id. at 385-87. 
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This argument failed since the external review requirement 
applied to the HMO – not the plan contracting with the HMO – 
and created the kind of indirect economic costs permitted by 
Travelers.199  Therefore, given no clear indicia of Congress’ 
preemptive intent, the state statute survived both section 514 and 
section 502 preemption.200  Writing for the four dissenters, Justice 
Thomas stated that Travelers, a section 514 case, should not  
impede section 502 preemption from ensuring the “exclusivity 
and uniformity of ERISA’s enforcement scheme[.]”201  Here, 
section 502 should preempt the Illinois measure because it created 
a “separate vehicle to assert a claim for benefits outside of, or in 
addition to, ERISA’s remedial scheme.”202
For a short while, it looked as if the Supreme Court might stay 
the restrictive preemption course regarding managed care when it 
unanimously found Kentucky’s any-willing-provider law to be 
saved from section 514’s “relate to” preemption in Kentucky Assoc. 
of Health Plans v. Miller.
  Still, Rush was a clear 
“win” for patients and states, even though it incentivized plans to 
self-insure in order to avoid section 514’s “saved” state insurance 
regulation.   
203  Since the 1985 case of Metropolitan Life 
Insur. Co. v. Massachusetts,204 the McCarron-Ferguson Act’s three-
part test for defining insurance had dictated the limits of section 
514’s savings clause protection for state insurance regulation.  In 
Rush Prudential, the Court had downgraded the requirements to 
“guideposts.”205  Now, it acknowledged that importing McCarron-
Ferguson criteria into ERISA law had “misdirected attention, 
failed to provide clear guidance to lower federal courts, and, as 
this case demonstrates, added little to the relevant analysis.”206  
For this reason, it announced a “clean break,” and stated that to be 
saved from section 514’s “relate to” preemption, a state law “must 
be specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance [and] 
must substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement between 
the insurer and the insured.”207  The Kentucky statute did both 
and therefore was saved because it (1) targeted HMOs which, at 
least in certain respects, act as insurers; and (2) affected risk 
pooling by effectively precluding HMOs from using closed 
networks in exchange for lower premiums.208
 
 199. Id. at 381, n.11. 
 
 200. Id. at 387 (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 741 (1985)). 
 201. Id. at 393-94(Thomas, J. dissenting) 
 202. Id. at 401. 
 203. 538 U.S. 329 (2003). 
 204. 471 U.S. 724 (1984). 
 205. 536 U.S. at 373. 
 206. Ky. Ass'n. of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 339-40 (2002). 
 207. Id. at 342 (citations omitted). 
 208. Id. at 338-39. 
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Coming just a year after Rush Prudential’s rejection of a section 
502 challenge to state regulation of managed care practices, 
Kentucky Health continued to respect the role of state law in 
overseeing health care.  However, any enthusiasm on the part of 
states, providers and patients was extinguished when the ground 
shifted yet again in Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila.209
Aetna Health Inc. v. 
Davila
  What was not 
yet apparent in Rush was that Justice Thomas’s pro-section 502 
preemption dissent would prevail in 2004’s 
.210
Stage 6: Back to the Playbook: A Return to Broad Preemption 
Brings a Return to Managed Care Games 
  Moreover, by upending ERISA jurisprudence once 
again, the Court would imperil state law and thus leave patients 
and providers with few remedies for managed care practices that 
were likely to become even more hard-line if shielded from state 
law.  And that is precisely what occurred in the aftermath of 
Davila. 
Since state regulation of managed care had survived ERISA 
preemption in Travelers through Kentucky Health, Texas appeared 
to be on firm ground in 1994 when it enacted its Health Care 
Liability Act to allow MCOs to be sued for negligent medical 
necessity determinations.211  The law did not mandate coverage of 
any particular benefits, but simply directed MCOs to exercise 
ordinary care in “making health care treatment decisions,” and 
imposed liability for harm proximately resulting from the breach 
of ordinary care.212
 
 209. 542 U.S. 200 (2004).  In hindsight, though, signs of a shift away from protecting patients 
appeared before both Rush Prudential (2002) and Kentucky Health (2003) and just a year after Pegram 
in Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001), a non-health benefits case, involving a section 514 
preemption challenge to a Washington statute requiring the automatic revocation upon divorce of a 
spouse’s designation as a beneficiary of a non-probate asset.  WASH. REV. CODE § 11.07.010(2)(A) 
(1994).  The decedent died two months after divorcing his second wife, having never changed his 
designation of her as the beneficiary of the employment pension plan, and his children sued to 
recover the pension proceeds.  The ex-wife argued that the statute was section 514 preempted and 
the Court agreed, finding an "impermissible connection [between state law and] ERISA plans" 
because the statute "binds plan administrators to a particular choice of rules for determining 
beneficiary status."  532 U.S. at 147.  An additional "prohibited connection" resulted since the state 
rule affected claims processing and payment and thus disrupted Congress's goal of ensuring 
nationally uniform plan administration.  Id. at 148.  Although the state law fell within an area 
traditionally left to state regulation, the presumption against preemption yielded to clear indicia of 
Congress’s intolerance for binding plan choices.  Id. at 151-152. 
  Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila consolidated two 
cases in which ERISA plan beneficiaries claimed their HMOs 
violated the statute by failing to exercise due care, one by denying 
coverage for a certain medication, and the other by denying an 
 210. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004). 
 211. Texas Health Care Liability Act, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 88.001-88.003 (West 
2004 Supp. Pamphlet) [hereinafter THCLA]. 
 212. Davila, 542 U.S. at 212 (citing THLCA § 88.002). 
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extension of inpatient benefits.213  Each patient initially complied 
with the MCO’s decision and claimed to have sustained physical 
harm as a result.214  Relying on the “indistinguishable”215 
precedent of Pegram, the Fifth Circuit viewed both suits as 
challenging non-fiduciary, mixed eligibility and treatment 
decisions under traditional and, as such, non-502 preempted state 
law.216  As a result, it lacked removal jurisdiction and remanded to 
the state court.  It did note, however, that the medical aspects of 
the MCOs’ actions signaled that a section 514 defense was unlikely 
to succeed.  This was the same court that had found just the 
opposite in Corcoran, but here, it explained that its earlier ruling 
had since been “undermine[d]” by the Travelers trilogy’s 
“curtail[ment]” of the scope of section 514 preemption217 as well as 
Pegram’s dicta suggesting no section 502 preemption of medical 
malpractice claims against an MCO.218
A unanimous Supreme Court saw things quite differently.  
Having authored Rush’s 4-justice dissent, Justice Thomas now 
spoke for all 9 in invoking ERISA’s “extraordinary preemptive 
power,”
 
219 “expansive preemption provisions”220 and “substantive 
regulatory requirements”221 which showed that Congress had 
carefully balanced various remedies in forbidding compensatory 
damages under both section 502 and, through preemption, state 
law, too.222  As a result, section 502 completely preempts state law 
challenges to medical necessity decisions because they qualify as 
claims for benefits.  Even state laws that are saved from section 
514 “relate to” preemption and do not replicate section 502 causes 
of action are section 502 preempted because they interfere with 
plan administration.223
 
 213. Id. at 204. 
  The Court’s holding was a stunning 
change in direction, not only because it effectively left injured 
patients with no meaningful relief, but also because the Court 
unanimously overlooked or at least underplayed its recent ERISA 
rulings. 
 214. Id. at 204-05.  Specifically, Mr. Davila had an adverse drug reaction, resulting in 
hospitalization while Mrs. Calad experienced post-surgical complications that necessitated re-
hospitalization. 
 215. Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 308 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 216. Id. at 315. 
 217. Id. at 314. 
 218. Id. at 315. 
 219. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004) (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 
481 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1987)). 
 220. Id. at 208. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 209. 
 223. To do so “would 'elevate form over substance and allow parties to evade' the pre-emptive 
scope of ERISA simply by relabeling their contract claims as claims for tortuous breach of contract.”  
Id. at 214 (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985)). 
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Gone was Pegram’s implicit endorsement of at least some state 
remedies where (as in Davila) the plan had delivered covered 
health care benefits, but the health care itself had fallen short of 
what was medically necessary.224  Moreover, notwithstanding 
Justice Thomas’s reliance on ERISA’s “substantive” requirements, 
the law in general and section 502 in particular say nothing about 
such circumstances.  If anything, the absence of such provisions 
shows that in 1974, when managed care was in its infancy, 
Congress never intended to displace longstanding state tort 
remedies, especially in the traditionally state-controlled health 
care quality context.  Any doubt about congressional intent should 
yield to Travelers’ presumption against preemption given no clear 
indication that Congress silently deprived patients of meaningful 
remedies simply because they receive health benefits through an 
ERISA plan.225
As a result, traditional rules of statutory construction as well as 
the Court’s own precedent argued against preemption of state law, 
especially where section 502 equitable relief does nothing for a 
patient who has already sustained injury following an MCO’s 
failure to exercise due care in making medical necessity 
determinations.  Yet, the Davila Court unanimously decided 
otherwise because here, the MCOs’ decisions were actionable 
under section 502 unlike the non-section 502 mixed eligibility-
treatment determinations in Pegram.
 
226  Pegram had focused on the 
content of the MCO’s decision, emphasizing that a medical 
necessity determination blends medical and administrative 
choices, which are not readily uncoupled.227  According to Davila, 
though, what really mattered in Pegram was not the nature of the 
HMO’s decision, but the nature of the HMO making the 
decision.228
Pegram involved an HMO that was owned and operated by the 
same physician who provided care; accordingly, she could dictate 
the timing and location of an ultrasound without breaching the 
plan’s fiduciary duties because she simultaneously acted as plan 
administrator and health care provider.  In contrast, the Davila UR 
nurse’s determination of the timing and location of post-surgical 
care was a purely administrative, non-medical, eligibility decision 
because the nurse was not a direct provider even though she 
 
 
 224. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
 225. Senators Kennedy, McCain and others made exactly this point in their amicus brief for 
Respondent.  2002 U.S. Briefs 1845 at *5; 2004 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 68 at **10 (“In enacting ERISA, 
Congress believed it was providing a series of federal pension rights to workers and their families.  
Its focus was entirely on establishing new minimum protections, not eliminating a wide swath of 
long-standing traditional state protections.”). 
 226. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 218 (2004). 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
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effectively supplanted the treating physician’s treatment protocol 
with her own.229  That such a “benefits determination is infused 
with medical judgments does not alter this result.”230  Under 
ERISA, an aggrieved patient may seek equitable relief by filing a 
section 502 claim for breach of fiduciary duties.231
Consequently, in the unanimous view of our nation’s highest 
court, a patient in severe pain, incapacitated by an acute health 
crisis, and most likely unaccompanied by legal counsel, should 
simply have paid for the extended stay or initiated complex – and 
expensive – litigation from her hospital bed.  That hospitals often 
condition admission on proof of insurance coverage seemed 
irrelevant to the Court.  In addition, even if the patient could pay 
the hospital costs up front, she would face the additional cost of 
retaining legal counsel to sue the plan since section 502’s solely 
equitable relief precludes a contingent fee.  Seeking a preliminary 
injunction to compel payment for the treatment would be equally 
impractical.  Few healthy individuals, let alone those debilitated 
by illness, could shoulder the legal and financial challenges of 
mounting a Rule 65 challenge.  And as a practical matter, post-
harm equitable relief is typically worthless.  Recognizing just how 
real and insurmountable these challenges are led one federal 
appellate judge to sum it up as follows: “[t]o the extent that 
participants are unable to seek an injunction compelling coverage, 
ERISA’s remedial scheme is almost entirely illusory.”
  With Davila, 
then, the decision-maker – rather than the decision itself – dictates 
available remedies, with no guarantee that any of those remedies 
will provide meaningful relief. 
232
The years since Davila’s return to broad section 502 preemption 
show a return to aggressive managed care tactics, especially when 
it comes to preemption challenges of provider reimbursement 
claims.  ERISA’s shifting impact on provider payment suits 
reflects the Supreme Court’s changing messages about ERISA’s 
preemptive scope as well as varying opinions about the provider’s 
status as an assignee of a patient’s health benefits.  Some courts 
have found that a provider can only collect if it has obtained a 
duly executed assignment of benefits from the patient, while 
others reason that such assignments have no effect since they are 
barred by the plan’s contract with the beneficiary.  Still others 
have held that because assignee claims derive from, and therefore 
“relate to” an ERISA benefits plan, the provider is limited to 
  So much 
for ERISA’s protection of plan participants and preservation of 
traditional state oversight of healthcare. 
 
 229. Id. at 218-19 (analogizing the fiduciary to a trustee of a medical trust). 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at 220-21. 
 232. DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 459 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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section 502’s equitable remedies which may bar monetary relief, 
leaving the provider with no effective remedy.233
Before Travelers, broad section 514 preemption often—but, as 
usual, inconsistently—preempted an array of provider claims for 
reimbursement.  In 1991, the Sixth Circuit in Cromwell v. Equicor-
Equitable HCA Corp.
 
234 ruled that section 514 and section 502 
preempted the hospital’s state law claims235 although the provider 
“could assert [a derivative section 502] claim as a ‘beneficiary’ of 
an employee benefit plan if it has received a valid assignment of 
benefits.”236  Otherwise, as neither a plan participant nor fiduciary, 
the hospital had no independent standing to seek section 502 
remedies and thus no way to collect for services rendered.237
[T]his procedure is emblematic of what seems to be an overzealous 
readiness in the federal courts to bar all state-law claims which even 
smell of ERISA under the broad umbrella of preemption without 
engaging in the complex case-by-case analysis which the statute and 
precedent require.  As in this case, the result of such a boiler-plate 
unreflective approach to ERISA preemption is to frequently leave 
deserving claimants without recourse in state or federal court.
  This 
prompted the dissent to observe: 
238
In Memorial Hospital v. Northbrook, the hospital obtained the 
plan’s verbal authorization before rendering care, but when the 
plan realized that the patient was not covered, it refused to pay.
 
239  
The plan argued that it acted as a fiduciary administering ERISA 
benefits, a hospital cannot become an assignee of those benefits, 
and section 514 preempts any challenge to its payment 
decisions.240  Working through the “preemption thicket,”241 the 
court agreed with regard to the state claims for negligent 
misrepresentation, equitable estoppel, and breach of contract since 
these were brought as an assignee and thus derived from the 
patient’s right to benefits, and the patient in this case was not 
covered.242
 
 233. Hobbs v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ala. 276 F.3d 1236, 1241 (11th Cir. 2001). 
  However, section 514 did not preempt the state 
 234. 944 F.2d 1272 (6th Cir. 1991). 
 235. “Appellants filed suit in state court alleging breach of contract, promissory estoppel, 
negligence and breach of good faith based on their reasonable reliance on Equicor's oral assurances 
of coverage.”  Id. at 1275. 
 236. Id. at 1278. 
 237. Id.; accord Riverside Med. Assocs. v. Humana, Inc., No. 06-61490-CIV-COHN, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 93739 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 28, 2006). 
 238. Cromwell, 944 F.2d at 1279 (Jones, J., dissenting). 
 239. 904 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1990). 
 240. Id. at 247-48. 
 241. Id. at 248. 
 242. As an early preemption case, it is not surprising that the Fifth Circuit had no problem with 
the case’s initial removal from state to the federal district court based on section 514 preemption.  Id. 
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statutory claim for unfair insurance practices (specifically, 
negligent misrepresentation of coverage) since it was not, as the 
plan had argued, “a derivative claim for benefits.”243  Moreover, 
the court stressed that although ERISA preemption may leave 
patients with no meaningful remedies,244
If providers have no recourse under either ERISA or state law in 
situations such as the one sub judice (where there is no coverage under 
the express terms of the plan, but a provider has relied on assurances 
that there is such coverage), providers will be understandably 
reluctant to accept the risk of non-payment, and may require up-front 
payment by beneficiaries—or impose other inconveniences—before 
treatment will be offered.  This does not serve, but rather directly 
defeats, the purpose of Congress [to protect employees and their 
beneficiaries] in enacting ERISA.
 leaving health care 
providers with none could not be tolerated because: 
245
ERISA challenges to provider reimbursement claims seemed to 
wane after Travelers appeared to limit section 514 preemption’s 
usefulness in evading liability.  But since Davila’s return to broad 
section 502 preemption, payers are increasingly resisting or 
delaying payment, and raising both complete and “relate to” 
challenges when sued for reimbursement.  For example, in 2007’s 
Mem’l Hermann Hosp. Sys. v. Aetna Health Inc., a hospital brought 
contract, tort and statutory claims against an HMO for failure to 
make prompt payment.
 
246  The case involved the same jurisdiction 
as Northbrook as well as the same state insurance statute, but 
unlike Northbrook, benefits were clearly covered and payment was 
due within forty-five days of billing.247  The defendant relied on 
section 502 to remove the case; although this strategy failed, it did 
succeed in subjecting the hospital to additional delays and costs in 
recouping the $1.2 million owed for treating the patient.248
In Louisiana Health Service & Indemnity Co. v. Rapides Healthcare 
System, a payer refused to honor assignments of plan benefits to 
 
 
at 243. 
 243. Id. at 247. 
 244. Id. at 248 (acknowledging that it had “held under different circumstances that ERISA 
preemption may occur even though ERISA itself could not offer an aggrieved employee a remedy 
for alleged misrepresentations.  That principle should not be extended, however, to encompass 
third-party providers . . . .”). 
 245. Id. at 247-248.  The Fifth Circuit’s explicit concern for congressional intent to protect plan 
participants is impressive but remarkable since this was entirely absent from its decision in Corcoran 
to deny relief to the parents whose pregnancy ended when their plan substituted its own fetal 
monitoring regimen for that of the treating specialist.  See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 246. CIVIL ACTION H-06-00828, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42126 (S.D. Tex. June 11, 2007). 
 247. Id. at *2-3. 
 248. Id. at **43-45 (asserting section 502 complete preemption as the basis for federal removal 
jurisdiction). 
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two hospitals on the ground that section 502 and section 514 
preempted the Louisiana state assignment statute.249  The Fifth 
Circuit found no “relate to” preemption because, unlike the Texas 
HMO liability statute in Davila, the Louisiana law made no 
mention of ERISA plans, imposed no obligations on them, and 
created no alternative remedies.250
ERISA section 502
  The plan’s obligations would 
be the same regardless of who brought that claim since the 
assignment statute “merely passes the sole enforcement 
mechanism— —from patient to hospital.”251  
Despite so much Supreme Court “guidance” by this point, the 
Fifth Circuit still struggled and acknowledged that its own 
decision directly conflicted with those of the Eighth and Tenth 
Circuits, which had found preemption of state assignment 
statutes.252  Its strongest basis for rejecting a similar approach was 
that those cases were decided before the Travelers Court’s return to 
“a traditional analysis of preemption,” and, thus, had erroneously 
failed to employ the starting presumption in favor of upholding 
traditional state law.253
What the court did not mention, however, is that post-Travelers 
courts had also found section 514 to preempt state assignment 
statutes.  The First Circuit did so with regard to Puerto Rico’s 
statute in City of Hope National Medical Center v. Healthplus, Inc., 
reasoning that section 514 prevents a state from restricting the 
ability of the plan to enforce a non-assignment provision in a 
benefits contract since Congress intended it to be negotiated by 
the parties.
 
254  The problem with this is that neither the patient nor 
the provider had any say in the negotiations, which effectively 
deprived them of any meaningful remedies.  Plus, as Mem’l 
Hermann Hosp. and La. Health Serv. show, even when a provider 
wins the preemption argument, it still faces additional delays and 
costs of having to sue for payment.255
 
 249. 461 F.3d 529, 531 (5th Cir. 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2010 (2008). 
  Thus, that providers 
routinely obtain assignments of ERISA health benefits does not 
mean that they will routinely obtain prompt payment.  And, as 
long as some courts find for some MCOs in some cases, ERISA 
preemption defenses, along with the litigation costs of opposing it, 
will continue.  What will also continue is that state law will not 
fulfill an essential function of allowing actors to predict the legal 
 250. Louisiana Health Serv., 461 F.3d at 534-35. 
 251. Id. at 536. 
 252. Id. at 540 (citing St. Francis Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 49 F.3d 
1460 (10th Cir. 1995); Ark. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary’s Hosp., Inc., 947 F.2d 1341 (8th Cir. 
1991)). 
 253. Id. at 540. 
 254. 156 F.3d 223, 229 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 255. Mem’l Hermann Hosp. Sys. v. Aetna Health Inc., CIVIL ACTION H-06-00828, 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 42126, at *3, *18 (S.D. Tex. June 11, 2007). 
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consequences of their actions as well as the conduct of others. 
Stage 7: ERISA Calls a Foul on State “Play or Pay” Mandates 
After several decades of increasingly nuanced and 
unpredictable ERISA rulings, patients, providers and states are 
justifiably frustrated.  And, as the complexity of ERISA disputes 
has grown, so too have health care expenditures and the ranks of 
the uninsured.  These developments are not entirely unrelated.  
Rather, given congressional intransigence, states are increasingly 
taking the lead in health care reform, especially with regard to 
expanding coverage.  While any state reform effort will encounter 
political opposition, ERISA presents a much more difficult 
obstacle.  Maryland learned this the hard way in the first case of 
what will surely be the next wave of ERISA preemption litigation: 
Retail Industrial Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder.256
Facing annual Medicaid costs of $5 billion and budgetary 
shortfalls exceeding $100 million, Maryland enacted its employer 
“Fair Share Act” in 2006.
 
257  Although facially neutral, the law 
basically targeted Wal-Mart, which employed 16,000 workers in 
Maryland, (many of whom had no or inadequate coverage) by 
requiring employers of 10,000 or more to devote at least eight 
percent of their total payrolls to employees’ health care or health 
insurance costs.  An employer could satisfy this obligation 
through direct benefits payments or paying the difference 
between current spending and eight percent to the state’s 
Medicaid fund.258
Wal-Mart did not challenge the law, but the Retail Industry 
Leaders Association (RILA) did, characterizing this “fair share” 
measure as a section 514 preempted employer mandate.  
Maryland countered that it was a generally applicable revenue 
statue like the one that survived section 514 preemption in 
Travelers.
 
259
 
 256. 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2006). 
  The court agreed with RILA, finding that the law 
effectively mandated a minimum level of health benefits while 
impermissibly interfering with plan administration through its 
reporting requirements.  The threat of inconsistent administrative 
burdens in violation of ERISA had already been realized by 
similarly intended, but differing financial and reporting 
requirements in Minnesota and New York’s Suffolk County.  
Despite no express reference to ERISA plans, Maryland’s Fair 
Share law inevitably created a connection with the plan that 
 257. Id. at 199; Fair Share Health Care Fund Act, 2006 MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 8.5-101 to 
-107 (2009). 
 258. Fielder, 475 F.3d at 183. 
 259. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
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triggered “relate to” preemption.260
RILA also succeeded in dismantling Suffolk County’s fair 
share ordinance in Retail Industrial Leaders Ass’n v. Suffolk 
County.
 
261  With reporting obligations that mirrored Maryland’s, 
the “Suffolk County Fair Share for Health Care Act”262 directed 
large, non-unionized retailers to meet an annual “public health 
care cost rate” in health care spending for each full or part-time 
employee.263  As in Fielder, the ordinance’s payment alternatives 
did not obviate the need to restructure plans in violation of section 
514.264
Massachusetts’ 2006 “Act to Control Costs and Improve 
Quality” took a much broader approach to health care reform, 
using a blend of insurance market reforms,
 
265 individual 
mandates266 and employer “incentives” to achieve universal 
coverage by 2009.267  Critical to the Massachusetts’ plan’s success 
are the law’s “play or pay” or “fair share” requirements that 
employers with more than 10 full-time workers make a 
“reasonable contribution” to their employee health care.  This can 
be accomplished by covering at least twenty-five percent of the 
workforce, paying at least a third of the cost of all workers’ 
individual plans, or making the annual “fair share” contribution, 
which, in 2008, was $295 per full-time worker.268  In addition, 
employers of ten or more full and/or part time employees must 
offer Internal Revenue Code section 125 “cafeteria plans” to 
enable workers to use pre-tax dollars in paying for coverage.269  
Failure to offer section 125 plans triggers significant “free rider” 
penalties to fund uncompensated care sought by that employer’s 
workers on five or more occasions.270
 
 260. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 
 261. 497 F. Supp. 2d 403 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 262. SUFFOLK COUNTY, N.Y., REG. LOCAL LAW §§ 325-1-7 (2005). 
 263. Retail Indus. Leaders v. Suffolk County, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 406 **3-5, 15. 
 264. Id. at  418. 
 265. Among these is the newly created “Commonwealth Connector,” which assists individuals 
and small businesses of fewer than 50 employees to find suitable private plans and promote 
consumer driven competition. 
 266. To date, the greatest criticism of the individual mandate is that it may not be economically 
sustainable since it is feared that premiums will be too high for the insured, too low for the insurer 
and therefore require too much in the way of state subsidies. 
 267. Act § 15 (adding M.G.L.MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 118E § 9A (West 2008)); see also Tim 
Murphy, The Massachusetts Health Plan: How Did They Do It?, 5-6 (Remarks at Alliance for Health 
Reform Conference, May 8, 2006) at 
http://www.allhealth.org/briefingmaterials/050806_Transcript_mass-164.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 
2010). 
 268. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 188. (West 2008). 
 269. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151F (West 2008); THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, 
THE COMMONWEALTH CONNECTOR: EMPLOYER HANDBOOK 8, 
https://www.mahealthconnector.org/portal/binary/com.epicentric.contentmanagement.servlet.C
ontentDeliveryServlet/FindInsurance/Employer/Overview/Employer%2520Handbook.pdf2009. 
 270. The actual penalties will range from ten percent to one hundred percent of the cost of the 
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Early supporters of the fair share “incentives” included two of 
the state’s largest health insurers—Blue Cross Blue Shield and 
Harvard Pilgrim Health Care—which would benefit from higher 
enrollments and employer contributions.271  Yet, some criticize the 
incentives for effectively reducing and/or taxing individual 
wages,272 and unduly incentivizing small to medium sized 
businesses to leave the state.273  A competing concern is that an 
annual fair share contribution of just a few hundred dollars per 
worker is so low that it will entice employers currently offering 
health benefits to drop coverage.274
Within Massachusetts itself, the law’s chief promoters and 
detractors have paid scant attention to the shadow of ERISA 
preemption.  Clearly, the design of the law reflects a conscious 
attempt to circumvent preemption.  The focus on fostering 
consumer driven competition in insurance markets and the 
reliance upon individual mandates make the statute at least 
appear to be more ERISA friendly than the Maryland and Suffolk 
County efforts to target “big box” retailers.  If anything, the statute 
might be even more vulnerable than its Maryland counterpart to a 
section 514 “relate to” challenge.  First, by applying to all 
employers with ten or more workers and imposing more 
requirements, it risks antagonizing far more employers than just 
Wal-Mart.  Second, although the IRS does not categorize section 
125 plans as ERISA plans, their compulsory inclusion in a benefits 
package might be problematic under section 514 given their 
attendant costs and administrative adjustments for affected 
employers.
 
275
 
services.  Robert Moffit & Nina Owcharenko, Understanding Key Parts of the Massachusetts Health 
Plan (Heritage Found., Web Memo No. 1045, 2006) at 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/wm1045.cfm (last visited Feb. 16, 2010).  Because 
§ 125 plans permit pre-tax, employee contributions, they may offer savings of up to forty percent of 
each dollar contributed.  They also enable the employer to save approximately $160 in annual 
federal withholding tax for each participating employee, although it costs about $100 per year per 
employee to create and administer a health-only cafeteria plan and several national companies 
compete for this business.  RICHARD CAUCHI, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATES’ 
USE OF “CAFETERIA PLANS” TO PROVIDE HEALTH INSURANCE (2009) at 
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=14515 (last visited Feb. 16, 2010). 
 
 271. Jeffrey Krasner, Business Leaders Suggest Health Law Too Easy on Firms, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 2, 
2007, at C1. 
 272. Nina Owcharenko & Robert Moffit, The Massachusetts Health Plan: Lessons for the States 
(Heritage Found., Backgrounder No. 1953, 2006), 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/bg1953.cfm. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Krasner, supra note 270.  To forestall such a result, one bill has already been submitted that 
would compel companies to pay for at least 50% of individual premiums.  S. 661, 185th Mass. Gen. 
Court, (Mass. 2007). 
 275. See PATRICIA A. BUTLER, CALIFORNIA HEALTHCARE FOUND., EMPLOYER CAFETERIA PLANS 2 
(2008), http://www.chcf.org/documents/insurance/EmployerCafeteriaPlans.pdf. ("[B]ecause the 
definition of employer group health coverage is different under ERISA than under the federal tax 
code, as long as employers do not endorse or promote specific individually purchased health 
insurance policies, [§ 125 plans] should not be subject to ERISA.  Nor should a state requirement 
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Third, the annual fair share contribution might be viewed as 
an employer mandate and/or interference with plan 
administration amounting to a section 514 preempted 
“connection” with a plan.  In this regard, the statute’s 
establishment of the Commonwealth “Connector” seems a most 
unfortunate choice of terminology.  The state would argue that 
this measure simply creates options, not a mandate, and that any 
payments make the law a funding measure with the kind of 
indirect economic impact that evaded section 514 preemption in 
Travelers.  Given that this argument failed in both Fielder and Retail 
Industrial Leaders v. Suffolk County, it is not clear whether the law 
would survive.  So far, however, there has been no ERISA 
challenge, although this is likely due to the extraordinary efforts to 
build political consensus during the law’s design and enactment 
instead of the lack of any vulnerability in the statute itself.  A 
similar approach was taken by Vermont’s 2006 reform initiative, 
which requires employers with uninsured workers to make a 
quarterly “Health Care Premium Contribution” of $1 per day for 
each full time equivalent employee.276
That state “fair share” or “play or pay” measures will inspire 
the same judicial inconsistency as past stages of ERISA 
preemption litigation became clear in Golden Gate Restaurant 
Association v. City of San Francisco.
  Like that of Massachusetts, 
Vermont’s mandatory employer contribution has not provoked an 
ERISA preemption challenge despite its inherent vulnerability. 
277  Unlike Fielder’s and Retail 
Industrial Leaders v. Suffolk County’s findings of section 514 “relate 
to” preemption, the Ninth Circuit upheld the employer spending 
requirements of San Francisco’s “Health Care Security 
Ordinance.”278  The ordinance applies to for profit employers 
doing business in the city and averaging twenty “covered” 
employees per quarter and to nonprofit employers that average 
fifty.279  Each quarter, these employers must make “required 
health care expenditures”280
 
that employers offer Section 125 plans be preempted by ERISA.”).  However, the National 
Conference of State Legislatures points out that “states still cannot regulate ‘self-insured’ health 
plans sponsored by many large employers.  Drafters need to recognize that care is needed to avoid 
a challenge to any broader law.”  CAUCHI, supra note 304. 
 determined by multiplying the total 
 276. Under Vermont’s 2006 Health Care Affordability Act, which took effect on April 1, 2007, a 
quarterly assessment is due if the employer does not cover all employees or has uninsured 
employees.  The law permitted an exemption for up to a specified number of full time equivalent 
employees.  Up to eight full time equivalent employees may be exempted for fiscal years 2007 and 
2008, six in 2009, and four in 2010.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 2002(5), 2003(a) (2007). 
 277. 546 F.3d 639 (9th Cir. 2008), petition for cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3691 (U.S. Jun. 5, 2009) ( No. 
08-1515). 
 278. Id. at 642 (citing S.F. CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 14.3(a) (2007)). 
 279. As defined by § 14.1(b)(2), "covered employees" (1) work in the City, (2) work at least ten 
hours per week, (3) have worked for the employer for at least ninety days, and (4) are not otherwise 
excluded from coverage under the Ordinance. 
 280. Id. at §§ 14.1(b)(3), (11), (12). 
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number of hours paid for each covered worker by “the applicable 
health care expenditure rate.”281  Employers must keep, and 
provide the City with reasonable access to “accurate records of 
health care expenditures, required health care expenditures, and 
proof of such expenditures made each quarter each year.”282  
Failure to abide by the recordkeeping provisions raises a 
presumption of nonpayment, which can only be rebutted by clear 
and convincing evidence.283  Under certain circumstances, self-
funded plans must meet the spending requirement, although 
there is no need to “keep track of their actual expenditures for 
each employee.”284
Given its requirement of quarterly payments based on each 
worker’s hours, shifting health care expenditure rates, and 
quarterly records of those payments, San Francisco’s initiative 
seems even more administratively intrusive than the preempted 
fair share measures of Fielder and Retail Industrial Leaders v. Suffolk 
County.  Plus, the potential for multiple and potentially 
inconsistent obligations clearly exists since Maryland, Suffolk 
County and Massachusetts have all used different “play or pay” 
rules.  Consequently, the federal district court found section 514 
preemption,
 
285 but the Ninth Circuit reversed because the 
payment options provided “a legitimate alternative to establishing 
or altering ERISA plans” since the employer or at least the 
employee stood to gain from whatever way the employer chose to 
meet its fair share obligation.286  As a result, the ordinance only 
exerted the kind of indirect economic impact that survived section 
514 preemption in Travelers.287
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit found no conflict with the 
Fourth Circuit’s Fielder ruling because of the Maryland law’s lack 
of any quid pro quo for fair share payments to the state effectively 
 
 
 281. S.F. ADMIN. CODE §§ 14.3(a), 14.1(b)(8).  At the time of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, the per 
employee health care expenditure was $1.17 per hour for for-profit employers with twenty to 
ninety-nine employees and non-profit employers with fifty or more employees, and $1.76 per hour 
for for-profit employers with 100 or more workers.  Golden Gate, 546 F.3d at 644, (citing San 
Francisco Office of Labor Standards Enforcement Reg. 5.2(A) (2007)).  Reg. 5.2(A) (2007) [hereinafter 
ESR] (implementing the employer spending requirements of the San Francisco Health Care Security 
ordinance). 
 282. Golden Gate, 546 F.3d at Id. at 645 (“but it does not require them ‘to maintain such records in 
any particular form.’”) (citing S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 14.3(b)(I)). 
 283. Id. at 645 (citing S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 14.3(b)(ii)). 
 284. “An employer providing ‘health coverage to some or all of its covered employees through a 
self-funded/self-insured plan ‘will’ comply with the spending requirement . . . if the preceding 
year's average expenditure rate per employee meets or exceeds the applicable expenditure rate’ for 
the employer.”  Id.  (citing ESR Reg. 6.2(B)(2)). 
 285. Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City & County o of San Francisco, 535 F. Supp. 2d 968, 979–80 
(N.D. Cal. 2007) (entering summary judgment for Restaurant Association and enjoining 
implementation of Ordinance’s ordinance’s employer spending requirements). 
 286. Golden Gate, 546 F.3d at 660. 
 287. Id. 
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left employers with only one “rational choice,” i.e., “to structure 
their ERISA healthcare benefit plans so as to meet the minimum 
spending threshold.”288
Fielder and Golden Gate demonstrate how cash-strapped states 
cannot count on the courts to free them of the binds of ERISA 
preemption as they tackle health care reform.  By July 2009, 
however, financial need had already trumped any reservations 
about legal ambiguity in the three states that enacted universal 
coverage initiatives, and an additional fourteen that have 
attempted or are at least considering similar measures.
  Unmentioned was that an employer and 
even an employee might want to forego any “quos” in order to 
avoid the ordinance’s administrative and economic costs.  For this 
reason, it is not at all clear that other courts would find Golden 
Gate and Fielder so easy to reconcile. 
289  As 
occurred in Maryland, Massachusetts, San Francisco and Suffolk 
County New York, fair share contributions290 and required section 
125 cafeteria plans are common strategies for expanding coverage 
while promoting affordability.291
Nevertheless, as Fielder, Retail Industrial Leaders v. Suffolk 
County and Golden Gate reveal, the long-term viability of play of 
pay provisions are far from certain if courts are left to interpret 
sections 502 and 514 with no input from Congress.  Although 
plaintiffs have petitioned for certiorari in Golden Gate, there is no 
need to await the outcome to know that the instability of the 
Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence will persist.  Although 
not an ERISA case, its 2009 ruling in Wyeth v. Levine made it 
abundantly clear that inconsistency and unpredictability are all 
that can be expected when it comes to preemption.
 
292  Most 
striking is the concurrence of Justice Thomas, whose insistence on 
restrictive preemption is nothing short of bewildering given that 
his Pegram dissent fueled the Court’s return to broad section 502 
preemption in Davila.293
Wyeth concerned a successful state law product liability claim 
against a pharmaceutical manufacturer for its failure to provide 
 
 
 288. Id. (quoting Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 193 (4th Cir. 2007)). 
 289. As summarized in a report by the Kaiser Family Foundation, universal coverage measures 
have been enacted in Maine, Massachusetts and Vermont and have been considered in California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wisconsin.  HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, STATES 
MOVING TOWARD COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH CARE REFORM (2009), 
http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/State-Health-Reform1.pdf. 
 290. See supra notes 257–268 and accompanying text. 
 291. Section 125 plans are now required in Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, and 
Rhode Island, optional and under consideration in Colorado and New York.  See supra note 264; 
RICHARD CAUCHI, States’ Use of “Cafeteria Plans” to Provide Health Insurance, NCSL (May 2009) 
available at http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=14515 (last visited Oct. 26, 2009). 
 292. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009). 
 293. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring); see infra notes 237–41 and accompanying text. 
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adequate labeling regarding the risks of “IV push” administration 
of the drug Phenergan.294  Since the FDA had approved the 
original label and subsequent revisions, Wyeth argued that the 
Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act preempted state common law 
claims.295  The state courts disagreed296 and, ultimately, the U.S. 
Supreme Court did, too.  Employing the kind of traditional 
preemption analysis used in Travelers,297 the Wyeth majority298 
characterized congressional purpose as “the ultimate touchstone 
in every pre-emption case”299
[I]n all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which 
Congress has ‘legislated . . . in a field which the States have 
traditionally occupied,’ . . . we ‘start with the assumption that the 
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the 
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress.’
 and emphasized that 
300
That drug labeling had been subject to federal oversight for 
over a century did not alter this result since “Congress does not 
cavalierly pre-empt state law causes of action.”
 
301
Although the federal statute at issue contained a preemption 
clause, it did not expressly preempt state tort claims.  This lack of 
preemption, coupled with Congress’s “certain awareness of the 
prevalence of state tort litigation” was “powerful evidence” that it 
never intended to preclude patients from asserting tort claims to 
challenge the safety of a drug or the adequacy of its labeling.
 
302  
Consequently, neither the FDCA nor FDA regulations preempted 
the patient’s common law claims.303
Ironically, ERISA, like the FDCA, has an express preemption 
clause in section 514 that says nothing about state tort claims. Plus, 
both drug safety and health care are encompassed by traditional 
 
 
 294. Id. 
 295. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 (et. seq.) [hereinafter “FDCA”]. 
 296. Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d . 179, 186–194 (Vt. 2006). 
 297. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 298. Justice Stevens’ opinion was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsberg, Breyer and Kennedy. 
Justice Thomas concurred, but only in the result.  129 S.Ct. at 1190. 
 299. Id. at 1194 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485, (1996) (internal quotation marks 
omitted from original) and Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)). 
 300. Id. at 1194-95 (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))). 
 301. Id. at 1195, n. 3 (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485). 
 302. Wyeth, 129 S.Ct. at 1200.  To underscore this point, the majority quoted the unanimous 
decision of Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 166–67 (1989), which 
explained that "[t]he case for federal pre-emption is particularly weak where Congress has 
indicated its awareness of the operation of state law in a field of federal interest, and has 
nonetheless decided to stand by both concepts and to tolerate whatever tension there [is] between 
them."  (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 303. Wyeth, 129 S.Ct. at 1204. 
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state authority, with tort remedies enjoying longstanding 
prominence in protecting individuals. Notwithstanding these 
glaring parallels, the Wyeth majority’s use of a 1992 Travelers-like 
rationale, after moving so far away from it in Davila in 2004 is not 
just ironic; it is baffling. 
Nowhere is the Court’s blithe inconsistency more astonishing 
than in Justice Thomas’s concurrence.  After all, when he 
dissented in Pegram and wrote for a unanimous court in Davila, he 
favored preemption due to ERISA’s extraordinary preemptive 
power,304 “expansive preemption provisions”305 and “substantive 
regulatory requirements.”306  That these operate in an area of 
traditional state law without expressly preempting common law 
claims or permitting comparable relief did nothing to dissuade 
him from finding that Congress implicitly intended to preempt 
state tort claims arising out of medical necessity decisions.307
Justice Thomas explained that he had become “increasingly 
skeptical” of “far-reaching implied pre-emption doctrines” that 
focus on congressional purpose and unconstitutionally “wander 
from the statutory text.”
  In 
Wyeth, though, he refused to join with the majority not because 
they had erred by finding no preemption, but because they had 
not gone far enough in deferring to state law! 
308  Even though he had similarly 
wandered in both Pegram and Davila, he did not hesitate in 
chastising Wyeth’s majority as well as the dissent for straying from 
the statute’s explicit text especially because text embodies 
legislative compromise.309
Supremacy Clause
  In his view, “our federal system in 
general, and the  in particular, accords pre-
emptive effect to only those policies that are actually authorized 
by and effectuated through the statutory text.”310  Thomas argued 
that the FDCA’s failure expressly to preempt state tort law was 
therefore dispositive; and that the majority should not have 
started with a presumption against preemption and then looked 
to the text and its overall purpose for evidence of a preemptive 
intent.311
Dissenting, Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and 
 
 
 304. Davila, 542 U.S. at 207 (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, at 65–66 (1987)). 
 305. Id. at 208. 
 306. Id. 
 307. See supra notes 187–226 and accompanying text. 
 308. Wyeth, 129 S.Ct. at 1205 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 309. Id. at 1216. 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. “Certainly, the absence of a statutory provision pre-empting all state tort suits related to 
approved federal drug labels is pertinent to a finding that such lawsuits are not pre-empted. But the 
relevance is in the fact that no statute explicitly pre-empts the lawsuits, and not in any inferences 
that the Court may draw from congressional silence about the motivations or policies underlying 
Congress' failure to act. (Thomas, J.)” 
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Justice Scalia, agreed that a starting presumption against 
preemption was unnecessary where conflict preemption is 
alleged.312  However, Congress’s objectives still mattered because 
“the ordinary principles of conflict pre-emption turn solely on 
whether a State has upset the regulatory balance struck by the 
federal agency.”313  Upon examining the FDCA’s purpose, five 
justices found that Congress never intended to preempt state tort 
claims and three concluded that preemption was needed to fulfill 
Congress’s choice of the FDA as the sole arbiter of drug safety.314
Although Wyeth is not an ERISA case, it could and – if the 
Court is at all consistent (which obviously, it has not been) – should 
complicate ERISA preemption.  Should the Supreme Court review 
Golden Gate, it will surely discuss the Fourth and Ninth Circuit’s 
competing views of ERISA preemption of state fair share 
requirements.  Davila’s broad view of preemption suggests that 
the Fourth Circuit’s position will prevail and the Court will find 
the San Francisco ordinance to be preempted and probably do so 
on both section 514 and section 502 grounds.  But Wyeth could 
throw a wrench into the Court’s approach. According to Justices 
Thomas, Roberts, Scalia and Alito in Wyeth, Travelers’ strong 
presumption against preemption should be used sparingly if at 
all, which would increase the likelihood of preemption.  Yet the 
remaining five justices along with Justice Thomas would view the 
lack of ERISA’s express preemption of state law, coupled with 
Congress’s awareness of the operation of state tort law in a 
traditional area of state concern as militating against preemption.  
This could make preemption less likely.  As it has for over thirty 
years, then, the Supreme Court’s ERISA preemption precedents 
predict nothing more than a coin flip.  Consequently, instead of 
relying on stare decisis, or standing firm over time,
 
315 litigants – 
particularly states – should prepare for dejicere decisis316
 
 as the 
Supreme Court continues to shake, rattle and roll through these 
cases. 
 
 312. Id. at 1229, n. 14 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 313. Id. at 1220. 
 314. In his dissent, which was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia, Justice Alito 
observed “[t]hus, it is not true that ‘this Court has long’ applied a presumption against pre-emption 
in conflict pre-emption cases.” Id. at 1229, n. 14 (quoting the majority’s earlier statement at 1195, n. 
3). 
 315. “Stare” has been defined as to “stand, stand still, stand firm; remain, rest. . . .”  See Whitakers 
Words, http://www.archives.nd.edu/cgi-bin/wordz.pl?keyword=stare (last visited Oct. 21, 2009). 
 316. “Dejicere” has been defined as to “throw/pour/jump/send/put/push/force/knock/bring 
down; cause to fall/drop; hang” – an apt description of how the Supreme Court has done anything 
but stand firm in its handling of ERISA preemption cases. See Whitaker’s Words, 
http://www.archives.nd.edu/cgi-bin/wordz.pl?english=jump: (last visited Oct 21, 2009). 
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c. Overtime: If That Was Then and This is Now, What Comes Next? 
Whether Congress fulfills President Obama’s demand for 
“health insurance reform,” achieves his earlier goal of broader 
“health care” reform, or does nothing at all, it must finally clarify: 
1) the appropriate scope of ERISA preemption, and 2) the 
availability of ERISA and state remedies.  Without such 
clarification, ERISA preemption will still bedevil patients seeking 
compensation for medically necessary care that comes too late or 
not at all.317
When the House of Representatives returned to Democratic 
control in January 2007, “The Health Partnership Through 
Creative Federalism Act” was introduced to encourage health 
reform at the state level.
  It will continue to ensnare providers seeking pre-
authorization and ultimate payment as well as obstruct interstitial 
state action, particularly when it comes to the kind of state and 
local innovations to expand access that occurred in Maryland, 
Massachusetts, and elsewhere.  That Congress needs to release 
state law from the confusion of ERISA’s text and judicial 
interpretation thereof is nothing new; to date, however, the federal 
response has been sporadic and disappointing. 
318  During hearings in May of 2007, 
representatives of the National Business Coalition on Health, the 
American Benefits Council, and “The ERISA Industry 
Committee”, among others, testified to the adverse effects of 
liberalizing ERISA waivers. An attorney who represents large 
employers and the ERISA Industry Committee,319 identified four 
reasons for preserving the status quo: (1) Preemption is needed to 
permit innovations that will continue and build upon the success 
of employer based health care; (2) “Congress carefully considered 
the effect of ERISA preemption on state health reform efforts more 
than 30 years ago, when ERISA was enacted” and “concluded that 
preemption was necessary to eliminate the threat of conflicting 
state and local regulation of employee benefit plans”;320
 
 317. Section 132 of H.R. 3200 requires internal and binding external review, including expedited 
reviews of urgent claims.  Hopefully, this will reduce the number of Corcoran- and Danca–like 
tragedies, but it will certainly not eradicate them since, as demonstrated in the state medical 
malpractice context, juries regularly award relief despite a finding of no liability by pre-trial 
screening panels.  H.R. 3200, 11th Cong. (2009).  The House bill does not address this problem other 
than § 151’s statement that § 514 of ERISA remains in effect.  H.R. 3200, 111th Cong. § 151 (2009); 29 
U.S.C. § 1144 (2006). 
 (3) Unlike, 
for example, Medicaid waivers, granting ERISA waivers would be 
 318. GovTrack.us., H.R.506 [110th], available at 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-506 (last visited Oct. 26, 2007) (providing for 
innovation in health care through State initiatives that expand coverage and access). 
 319. Health Care Reform: Recommendations to Improve Coordination of Federal and State Initiatives 
Before the Subcomm. On Health, Employment, Labor and Pensions of the H. Comm. On Education and 
Labor, 110th  Cong. 39-40 (2007) (statement of Amy N. Moore, Covington & Burling LLP). 
 320. Id. at 3. 
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too complicated since no waiver approval process currently exists; 
and (4) “[S]tates do not need ERISA waivers” to accomplish 
needed reforms since problems such as “insuring the 
unemployed, providing reliable and accessible information on 
health care cost and quality, making affordable insurance 
available to individuals and small groups – are outside the scope 
of ERISA’s preemption provisions.”321
That an advocate for large employer interests sought to 
preserve preemption came as no surprise.  What is so troubling, 
however, is that the grounds asserted were not just self-interested, 
but also inaccurate or at least naïve.  First, many employers have 
made admirable efforts to bring better coverage to greater 
numbers at lower costs, but this should not entitle them to free—
and sole—rein in deciding how patients and providers are treated 
or how the uninsured and state payers are affected.  Second, as 
demonstrated by 35 years of section 502 and section 514 litigation, 
Congress did not consider preemption’s impact on “state health 
care reform” when it passed ERISA.  It focused instead on pension 
plan reform and paid little attention to the full ramifications of 
preemption for a managed care industry that was in its infancy 
during the 1970’s. That the federal HMO Act contemporaneously 
required employers to offer HMO plans is just one of many indicia 
that health plan accountability was simply not on the 
congressional radar.  Third, arguing that waivers are too 
complicated because there is no system in place is akin to arguing 
in the 1930’s that income taxes could never be levied since there 
was no system in place.  The idea simply makes no sense, 
especially with the Medicaid waiver program as a ready analogue 
to put an ERISA waiver process in place.  Fourth, the problems of 
improving quality and expanding coverage which are described 
as “outside the scope” of ERISA preemption
 
322 have ironically 
been placed within that scope by large employers seeking to 
evade state oversight and defeat state health care reform 
initiatives.  As demonstrated by patients, providers and states 
during three decades of legislative and judicial wrangling, ERISA 
preemption has presented huge obstacles to everyone but 
employers.  In this regard, state officials from Montana, Maryland, 
and New Jersey testified to the many and varied reform efforts 
that have been blocked by ERISA preemption, particularly with 
respect to self-funded plans.323
In 2007, ERISA waivers may have been the most that could be 
hoped for given Congress’s longstanding resistance to wide scale 
 
 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. at III.  http://edworkforce.house.gov/hearings/help052207.shtml 
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health reform.  However, when President Obama took office, 
things looked quite different.  After all, Massachusetts had already 
seen more than 400,000 formerly uninsured persons obtain 
coverage324 with employers remaining in-state and in the business 
of insuring their workers.325  During the first half of 2009, such 
promise, combined with economic recession, relentless cost 
escalation, and rising unemployment adding to the nation’s 47 
million of uninsured326 generated broad political and public 
consensus that the time had come to accomplish comprehensive 
reform at the national level.327
Not surprisingly, however, political consensus quickly 
splintered in the face of the devil in the details of expanding 
coverage and controlling costs while preserving if not improving 
quality.  Unlike President Clinton who charged his wife with 
chairing a task force to design a complex and ultimately failed 
proposal,
 
328
 
 324. In its May 2009 quarterly report on Health Care in Massachusetts, the Massachusetts 
Division of Health Care and Finance and Policy reported an increase of 428,000 people in private or 
subsidized health care plans (excluding Medicare beneficiaries) since the state’s reforms took effect 
in June, 2006.  MASS. DIV. OF HEALTH CARE AND FIN. POLICY, HEALTH CARE IN MASSACHUSETTS: KEY 
INDICATORS 3 (2009), available at 
http://www.mass.gov/Eeohhs2/docs/dhcfp/r/pubs/09/Key_Indicators_May_09.pdf. 
 President Obama articulated eight guidelines for 
 325. In its December 2008 analysis of 2007 employer survey data, the Massachusetts Department 
of Health Care Finance and Policy indicates that rates of employer sponsored health benefits have 
remained stable in Massachusetts following implementation of state reform, while national 
employer sponsored coverage rates have declined.  MASS. DIV. OF HEALTH CARE AND FIN. POLICY, 
MASSACHUSETTS EMPLOYER SURVEY 2007 4 (2008) available at 
http://www.mass.gov/Eeohhs2/docs/dhcfp/r/pubs/08/employer_report_2007.ppt.  See also 
Sharon K. Long & Paul B. Masi, How Have Employers Responded To Health Reform In Massachusetts? 
Employees’ Views At The End Of One Year, 27 HEALTH AFFAIRS w576, W576 (2008) (employee survey 
results confirm that employers made no significant changes in coverage following enactment of 
state health reform). 
 326. See, e.g., Todd P. Gilmer and & Richard G. Kronick, “Hard Times and Health Insurance: How 
Many Americans Will be Uninsured by 2010?” 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS AFF. w-573 (web exclusive 2009) 
(predicting that, absent major changes in current policy, the number of uninsured in America will 
grow by 6.9 million just due to higher coverage costs (increasing from 17.2% in 2007 to 19.2%  – or 
52 million – by 2010) with “more millions” losing coverage due to job losses). 
 327. See, e.g., KRISTOF STREMKIS ET AL., HEALTH CARE OPINION LEADERS’ VIEWS ON PRIORITIES FOR 
THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION (“The Commonwealth Fund/Modern Healthcare Health Care 
Opinion Leaders Survey: Views on Priorities for the Obama Administration, January 2009,” 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/Surveys/2008/The-Commonwealth-Fund-
Modern-Healthcare-Health-Care-Opinion-Leaders-Survey--Views-on-Priorities-for.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2009) (a survey of 194 “[p]eer-nominated experts in health care policy, finance, and 
delivery; select members of the Modern Healthcare database” suggests that “President Obama 
enjoys a strong mandate for major elements of the health care reform proposal unveiled during the 
2008 presidential campaign.”)); Jim Cooper and & Michael Castle,  “Health Reform: A Bipartisan 
View,” 28 HEALTH AFF.AIRS w-169 (web exclusive March 2009) (“Political and policy factors suggest 
that President-elect Barack Obama is in a much better position than his predecessors to achieve 
comprehensive health reform, including universal coverage.); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Taps 
Clinton Ideas but Not Clinton Herself, N.Y. TIMES, 19, (Mar. 5, 2009) (“Experts say the political climate 
for passing major health care changes is more favorable than ever, with business leaders, 
pharmaceutical and hospital executives, insurance officials and advocates for patients all agreeing 
the need is urgent.”). 
 328. See generally The Politics Of Health Reform: A Collection Of Perspectives, 27  HEALTH AFFAIRS 
688 (2008); Walter A. Zelman, The Rationale Behind the Clinton Health Care Reform Plan, 13 HEALTH 
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“comprehensive health reform,”329 but put Congress in charge of 
the logistics.330  In a year when the economy continues to stumble 
and all 435 members of the House and one third of 100 Senators 
are up for reelection, there is little appetite for hitting voters in 
their wallets.  Consequently, even Democrats have resisted 
President Obama’s initial idea of imposing a broad-based income 
tax on employer sponsored health benefits331 or a more limited tax 
on the affluent332 to fund reform. Requiring individuals to have 
insurance has also gained little traction even though the 
Congressional Budget Office lists “enforceable individual 
mandates” as necessary for achieving universal coverage.333  And 
the President’s idea of creating a public plan to compete with 
private payers was at one point described by Senator Grassley 
(Republican, Iowa) as “a deal breaker for Republicans if it’s in, 
and . . . a deal breaker for Democrats if it’s not[.]”334
 
AFFAIRS 9 (1994). 
  With 
members of Congress launching new proposals, attacks and 
counter-attacks each day, it is becoming increasingly clear that 
federal action, if any, will be scaled back from the comprehensive 
reform that finally seemed within reach when President Obama 
 329. The Administration’s initial goals for “comprehensive health reform” were to: 1) reduce costs; 
2) protect against health-care related bankruptcy; 3) guarantee choice of providers and plans; 4) 
promote prevention and wellness; 5) improve the safety and quality of care; 6) “assure affordable, 
quality care for all Americans”; 7) ensure portability of coverage; 8) end pre-existing conditions 
exclusions.  WHITE HOUSE, Health Care, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/health_care/ (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2009) (emphasis added). 
 330. See, e.g., Laura Meckler, Congress is Left to Flesh Out the Details, WALL ST. J., May 19, 2009, at 
A4 (discussing the President’s “unusual approach” of “laying out the big picture, and letting 
lawmakers fill in critical details”); Robert Pear, Obama's Health Plan, Ambitious in Any Economy, Is 
Tougher in This One, N.Y. TIMES, March 2, 2009, at 14. 
 331. See, e.g., Carrie Budoff Brown & Chris Frates, Harry Reid Jumps Into Health Negotiations, 
POLITICO.COM, July 7, 2009, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0709/24676.html (noting 
participants in the Senate were having “second thoughts about taxing health benefits, which would 
raise $340 billion over 10 years” but revealed as “highly unpopular” in public polling); Key Senate 
Panel Struggles To Reach Consensus, KAISER HEALTH NEWS, July 20, 2009, 
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Daily-Reports/2009/July/20/Senate-Monday.aspx; House Face-
off Looms Over Sweeping Health Bill, KAISER HEALTH NEWS, July 20, 2009, 
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Daily-Reports/2009/July/20/Monday-House.aspx. 
 332. Alex Wayne & Jonathan Allen, Blue Dogs Bare Teeth at Health Bill Markup, WASHINGTON 
HEALTH POLICY WEEK IN REVIEW, July 20, 2009, 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/Newsletters/Washington-Health-Policy-in-
Review/2009/Jul/July-20-2009/Blue-Dogs-Bare-Teeth-at-Health-Bill-Markup.aspx (describing 
Democratic opposition to H.R. 3200’s funding provisions2009). 
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assumed office. 
Nevertheless, even broad-based reform will not completely 
erase ERISA preemption’s detrimental impact on the large 
majority of patients and providers who deal with employer-
sponsored health care.  Congress might very well follow 
Massachusetts’ lead and require individuals to obtain coverage, 
and also mandate employers to “play or pay” in covering their 
workers (the latter of which is vulnerable to ERISA preemption 
when required by states).335
However, none would do a thing to protect patients from 
falling into ERISA’s remedial vacuum for harms resulting from 
MCO medical necessity determinations for employer sponsored 
plans.  None would help providers who rendered care but need to 
overcome costly ERISA barriers to payment.  In addition, none 
would help states whose traditional role in overseeing health care 
would likely be viewed as more fragmented and muddled than 
ever.  Reform should not only bring change, it should bring 
improvement even if only through clarification of roles, rights and 
remedies of the various players.  It is fair to say that, at least so far, 
the outlook is less than promising. 
 Congress may insist that certain 
benefits be offered, and put an end to various exclusions—
measures that, if mandated by states, would be preempted when 
applied to employer-sponsored plans, especially those that are 
self-insured. Such actions would expand coverage, improve access 
and maybe even contain costs. 
Perhaps the sole point of agreement among the President and 
his opponents is their determination to avoid “the preemption 
thicket”336 by leaving both state remedies and sections 502 and 514 
intact.337  For instance, section 132 of “The Affordable Health 
Choices Act” that passed in the House and the Senate Health, 
Education, Labor and Pensions Committee in July 2009 provides 
for internal and external review of coverage and medical necessity 
disputes.  Ideally, a provision of this kind could reduce the kinds 
of injuries that occurred in Corcoran338 and Danca339
 
 335. See supra notes 267 and 274, and accompanying text. 
 discussed 
above. Still, state law remains intact unless otherwise provided 
although “[n]othing . . . shall be construed as affecting the 
 336. Memorial Hospital v. Northbrook, 904 F.2d 236, 2448 (5th Cir. 1990), discussed supra note 
222. 
 337. For instance, in the H.R. 3200 “Affordable Health Choices Act,” § 151(a)(1) states that, 
unless otherwise provided, the requirements of the overall Act “do not supercede . . . [ERISA], or 
State law” subject to § 151(a)(2)’s qualification that “[n]othing in [§ 151(a)(1)] shall be construed as 
affecting the application of section 514 of [ERISA].” H.R.3200, 111th Cong. § 151(a)(1) (2009) available 
at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c111:1:./temp/~c111Mnq9NO:e62784: (last visited Oct. 
26, 2009). 
 338. See supra notes 61 and 71, and accompanying text. 
 339. See supra notes 134 and 139, and accompanying text. 
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application of section 514 of [ERISA].”  On its face, preserving 
state law seems reasonable except for the sad fact that, once a 
patient has been injured, ERISA preempts state law remedies, and 
ERISA’s equitable remedies are futile post-injury.340
The 107th Congress came close to filling the ERISA vacuum 
when it was scheduled to debate and vote on the “Bipartisan 
Patient Protection Act”
 
341 following its August 2001 recess.  The 
major sticking point was whether patients would be able to 
recover compensatory damages for harm proximately resulting 
from MCO medical necessity determinations or other benefit 
denials or delays.  Coming shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Pegram decision and before that Court’s hairpin turn in Rush, the 
Senate’s more generous version was seen as “basically following 
the approach suggested by Pegram, allowing state courts to apply 
traditional malpractice norms to claims that unreasonable medical 
decisions by MCOs have contributed to death or disability.”342
What soon became clear was that no part of the bill could 
survive the September 11, 2001 attacks.  At that point, matters of 
national security became all consuming, patients’ rights toppled 
from the legislature’s agenda and, as described earlier, Pegram’s 
promise of available state remedies evaporated with Davila’s 
resuscitation of broad ERISA preemption.
  
Despite a general consensus that some version of the bill would 
pass, it was not at all clear whether patients would have better 
remedies. 
343
Like too many aspects of health care in America today, the 
preemption of remedies problem is getting worse, not better, and 
not just for patients, but—as explained above—for providers and 
states, too.  If nothing is done to fill ERISA’s remedial vacuum, 
and employers are mandated or incentivized to expand health 
benefits, more patients will be covered by ERISA-qualified health 
benefits plans.  As a result, more patients will have no meaningful 
remedy after sustaining harm due to an MCO’s decision. This 
could also mean that more health care providers, already 
struggling with declining reimbursement rates, will need to spend 
valuable time challenging treatment denials and, after rendering 
  It has taken eight 
years for health care to reemerge as a domestic priority, but fixing 
ERISA preemption is no longer on the legislative wish-list. Yet, as 
evidenced by the Supreme Court’s post-Pegram preemption 
decisions of Davila and Wyeth, the ERISA preemption thicket is 
more confounding than ever. 
 
 340. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 341. S.1052 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 2563, 107th Cong. (2001). 
 342. Sylvia A. Law, Do We Still Need a Federal Patients' Bill of Rights?, 3 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & 
ETHICS 1, 310 (2002). 
 343. See supra notes 237-41 and accompanying text. 
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care, face more difficulty in getting paid.  And all of this will be 
the direct result of the continuing ability of MCOs to invoke 
section 502 and section 514 preemption to evade accountability to 
patients and providers alike. 
It may be a harsh reality, but it is reality nonetheless to say that 
Congress needs to reform ERISA preemption or liberalize the 
availability of state ERISA waivers. It could fix ERISA by 
clarifying the scope of preemption with regard to the kinds of 
coverage and medical necessity decisions that result from the 
integration of finance and delivery of health care.  It must state 
explicitly whether state compensatory remedies are available.  If 
state remedies are not available, it must include them in ERISA 
itself by amending section 502’s civil enforcement scheme. 
It is far more likely, however, that overt ERISA reform will 
prove impractical due to the need to conserve political capital at a 
time of unprecedented challenges at home and abroad and a 
deepening divide over whether and how to undertake federal 
health care reform.  For this reason, Congress should look to 
ERISA waivers as critical to any next step.  If comprehensive 
federal reform collapses in whole or significant part, allowing 
state experimentation will offer the best promise for figuring out 
how to fix the health care system since it is broken in so many 
places and in so many ways.  Waivers would also allow much 
needed flexibility since what might work for one state or region 
may not be suited to the economy or geography of another—a 
realization that will not be new to Congress since it granted a 
waiver to Hawaii when it initially passed ERISA.344
III. CONCLUSION 
  And finally, 
waivers would allow states to do what federal law currently does 
not: accord some form of protection to both patient and provider 
as Congress fights its way to more comprehensive reforms. 
President Obama had hoped that the weeks leading up to 
August 2009’s congressional recess would be marked by 
consensus, compromise, and ultimate passage of a health reform 
bill.  Unfortunately, consensus was displaced by conflict, 
compromise ceded to impasse, and civil discourse among a 
bipartisan Congress devolved to increasingly strident dissent.  In 
mid-July, Senator Jim Demint (Republican – S.C.) assured the 
group “Conservatives for Patient Rights” that “this health care 
issue is D-Day for freedom in America” and “if we’re able to stop 
Obama on this it will be his Waterloo.  It will break him.”345
 
 344. See, e.g., John Colmers supra note 318, at 28 (statement of John Comers, Secretary, Maryland 
Dept. of Health and Mental Hygiene). 
  A few 
 345. Ben Smith, Health Reform Foes Plan Obama's 'Waterloo', POLITICO.COM,  (July 17 2009,) 
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days later, President Obama responded: 
This isn’t about me. This isn’t about politics. This is about a health 
care system – a health care system that is breaking America’s families, 
breaking America’s businesses and breaking America’s economy, and 
we can’t afford the politics of delay and defeat when it comes to 
healthcare – not this time, not now. There are too many lives and 
livelihoods at stake. There are too many families who will be crushed 
if insurance premiums continue to rise three times as fast as wages. 
There are too many businesses that will be forced to shed workers, 
scale back benefits, or drop coverage unless we get spiraling health 
care costs under control.346
It is true that lives and livelihoods are at stake.  Perhaps it 
should not be about politics, but in this country, it is all about 
politics when it comes to making policy, and it is all about the 
intricacies of legislation when it comes to putting policy into 
practice.  It is true that there is much to be done to fix health care 
in America, and improving the “Four Cs” of “coverage, cost 
control, coordinated care, and choice” is undoubtedly essential.
 
347
On March 21, 2010, the U.S. House of Representatives passed 
the Reconciliation Act of 2010, H.R. 4872 which will initiate 
insurance reforms, individual mandates and employer “play or 
pay” incentives. Although subsequent amendments are expected, 
section 251(a) currently permits a state to seek an ERISA waiver 
for the purpose of implementing a single payer system.  
Otherwise, ERISA preemption, along with its complexities and 
problems, remains intact and is likely to grow more confounding 
for states, providers, and patients as the new law takes effect. 
 
Not unrelated, however, is the way in which ERISA – an 
employee protective statute – has been wielded by payers to avoid 
accountability, and erratically interpreted by the courts to permit 
if not promote this absurd result.  Health care reform without 
ERISA preemption reform or waivers runs the risk of leaving 
patients with no remedies and providers with no pay.  It also 
curtails the ability of states to do much about it.  All of these 
concerns are troubling, but the latter is surely the most disturbing.  
After all, it is understandable if Congress’s plate is too full to take 
this on, but it is unforgiveable if Congress will not allow the states 
to try. 
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